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as the Legal Infrastructure 
for Innovation 
Robert W. Gomulkiewicz* 
The flow of information that naturally occurs when employees change 
firms plays a vital role in spurring innovation. Numerous law review 
articles have explored how covenants-not-to-compete (“non-competes”) 
can impede this important information flow. In 1999 Professor Ronald 
Gilson published an influential article concluding that California’s ban on 
non-competes led to the rise of California’s Silicon Valley and the 
comparative decline of Massachusetts’ high technology corridor known as 
Route 128. Despite the scholarly praise for California’s approach, most 
states enforce non-competes that are reasonable. That may change, 
however, because many states are re-evaluating their non-compete laws to 
avoid Gilson’s cautionary tale about the fate of Route 128. But do states 
really need to ban non-competes in order to provide an inviting platform 
for innovation? This Article provides an answer to that important and 
intriguing question by examining, for the first time, whether technology 
firms actually enforce non-competes. Evidence from Washington State 
indicates that technology firms rarely enforce non-competes. In other 
words, non-competes are very leaky — knowledge workers move freely 
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from one technology business to another in Washington just as they do in 
California. The Washington case study has crucial implications for all 
states. It suggests that states do not need to ban non-competes in order to 
foster innovation as many scholars contend. It also shows that leaky non-
competes provide better protection for trade secrets than a complete ban 
provides. States can offer a fertile legal infrastructure for innovation 
without banning non-competes by taking steps to assure that non-compete 
enforcement is leaky, including measures to address the potential chilling 
effect of non-competes. California, for its part, should embrace the so-
called “trade secret exception” to its ban on non-competes to improve 
California’s legal infrastructure for start-ups and established firms that 
rely on robust trade secret protection. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We live in an information economy where information technology 
firms covet their knowledge workers. A firm’s success depends on 
recruiting smart researchers, skillful product developers, and clever 
business strategists,1 so firms compete aggressively for the most 
talented workers. Talented workers move as they see fit, sometimes for 
more money but often in search of the most interesting work. 
However, a departing employee’s covenant-not-to-compete (often 
called a “non-compete”) can impede the flow of talent. 
Numerous law review articles have explored the use of non-
competes.2 On the positive side, scholars point out that non-competes 
provide an incentive for firms to invest in employee training, 
encourage employees to share secrets within the firm, and safeguard 
against the disclosure of confidential information to a competitor.3 On 
the negative side, scholars emphasize that non-competes stymie an 
individual’s fundamental right to earn a living.4 This seems 
particularly unjust when an employee has limited bargaining power 
and receives no separate consideration for the covenant.5 Non-
 
 1 See Matt Day, Microsoft Employees — Past and Present — Look Back over the 
Years, SEATTLE TIMES, May 24, 2015, at D6 (asking Microsoft Senior Vice President 
Yusuf Mehdi about where Microsoft will be in another 40 years and quoting him as 
saying that success hinges on making Microsoft an appealing stop for technology’s 
most talented minds: “It isn’t the technology. It isn’t the products or services. They all 
come and go. What won’t change is we’ll still get the best and brightest. If we keep 
that, this place is going to be around for a long, long time”). 
 2 A Westlaw search on April 23, 2014 performed by the reference librarians of the 
Gallagher Law Library at the University of Washington School of Law found several 
hundred law journal articles discussing various aspects of non-competes. A 
representative sampling of those articles can be found in the footnotes infra 
Introduction–Part IV. 
 3 See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 
650-53 (1960). 
 4 See Charles T. Graves, Analyzing the Non-Competition Covenant as a Category of 
Intellectual Property Regulation, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 69, 71-72 (2011) 
(criticizing the enforcement of non-competes on several grounds). 
 5 See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility: The 
Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power via Standard Form Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 963 [hereinafter Cubewrap Contracts] (arguing that courts do not properly 
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competes also interfere with the flow of information that naturally 
results when employees change firms. Scholars argue that these 
“information spillovers” play a critical role in spurring innovation in 
technology industries.6 
Discussion by legal scholars about the link between non-competes 
and information spillovers7 began in earnest in 1999 when Professor 
Ronald Gilson published an influential article comparing innovation 
in California to that in Massachusetts.8 He concluded that California’s 
law against enforcing non-competes provided a superior legal 
infrastructure for innovation, which explained the rise of Silicon 
Valley as an industrial district and the comparative decline of 
Massachusetts’ high technology corridor known as Route 128.9 Many 
scholars agree with Gilson, arguing that California’s ban on non-
competes is not only fair to workers, but provides the best approach 
for nurturing technology businesses (especially startups) and 
stimulating innovation in general.10 
 
consider the bargaining power of employees); Kate O’Neill, ‘Should I Stay or Should I 
Go?’ — Covenants Not to Compete in a Down Economy: A Proposal for Better Advocacy 
and Better Judicial Opinions, 6 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 83 (2010) (analyzing non-compete 
agreements from a theoretical and practical standpoint).  
 6 See ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE 118-19 (2013); On Amir & Orly 
Lobel, Driving Performance: A Growth Theory of Noncompete Law, 16 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 833, 856-61 (2013); T. Leigh Anenson, The Role of Equity in Employment 
Noncompetition Cases, 42 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 54 (2005). But see Grant R. Garber, 
Comment, Noncompete Clauses: Employee Mobility, Innovation Ecosystems, and 
Multinational R&D Offshoring, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1079, 1082 (2013) (arguing that 
non-enforcement of non-competes “may be detrimental to the development of 
innovation ecosystems in emerging markets”). 
 7 This article focuses on the relationship between non-competes and innovation 
in the software and information technology sector rather than the general fairness of 
non-competes or their role in other contexts such as professional services or sales. See 
Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not to Compete in a Knowledge Economy: Balancing 
Innovation from Employee Mobility Against Legal Protection for Human Capital, 27 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287, 315-16 (2006) [hereinafter Covenants Not to Compete]. 
 8 Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: 
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 575 
(1999). 
 9 Id. at 629. 
 10 See, e.g., LOBEL, supra note 6, at 200 (arguing that even when removing the Bay 
Area to control for the possible outlier effect of California sunshine, “states where 
noncompetes are not enforced or weakly enforced more venture capital results in 
higher levels of entrepreneurship, more patenting, and better employment rates”); 
Viva R. Moffat, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 939, 945-46 
(2012) [hereinafter Making Non-Competes Unenforceable] (discussing California and 
North Dakota “policy [that] rests on the belief that an absence of restrictions on the 
free flow of labor will promote commercial activity”); Viva R. Moffat, The Wrong Tool 
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Despite the scholarly praise for California’s approach, most states 
enforce non-competes that are reasonable as to duration, geographic 
reach, and scope of work covered.11 That may change, however, as 
state governments have renewed their efforts to provide a welcoming 
environment for knowledge workers and technology businesses.12 
States that currently serve as the home to innovation seem particularly 
keen to implement an innovation-friendly legal infrastructure, hoping 
to avoid the fate of Route 128.13 No state governor or legislature wants 
to be accused of losing its innovative edge by failing to update its non-
compete laws. Several states are considering legislation to ban non-
competes and others are being urged to do so.14 Indeed, some scholars 
argue that non-competes should be banned uniformly across the 
nation.15 But do states really need to ban non-competes in order to 
provide the optimal legal infrastructure for innovation? 
 
for the Wrong Job: The IP Problem with Noncompetition Agreements, 52 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 873, 873 (2010) [hereinafter The Wrong Tool] (arguing that employee 
noncompetition agreements ought to be unenforceable); see also Sampsa Samila & Olav 
Sorenson, Non-Compete Covenants: Incentives to Innovate or Impediments to Growth, 57 
MGMT. SCI. 425, 425 (2010). As explained infra, Professor Gilson predicted that other 
approaches could work as well as California’s ban on non-competes, but Gilson’s article 
is often cited as proof of California’s superior approach to non-competes and that 
message has been the one emphasized by many scholars since Gilson. 
 11 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.774 (2015); discussion infra Part I 
(discussing common law and statutory approaches to non-competes). 
 12 See Bishara, Covenants Not to Compete, supra note 7, at 299 (“[I]t is clear that 
states are interested in promoting knowledge-based industries impacted by [non-
compete] policy.”). 
 13 According to Bloomberg Business News, the top homes for innovation include: 
Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, 
Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and 
Wisconsin. See Most Innovative in U.S.: States, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 18, 2013), http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/visual-data/best-and-worst/most-innovative-in-u-dot-s-states. 
 14 Moffat, The Wrong Tool, supra note 10, at 880 (reporting that various 
legislatures have considered or passed non-compete statutes, and that the ALI is 
drafting non-compete provisions as part of its RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT 
LAW). The Alliance for Open Competition (“AOC”) is lobbying nationwide for a ban 
on non-competes. See ALLIANCE FOR OPEN COMPETITION, http://opencompetition. 
wordpress.com/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2014). The AOC has been particularly active in 
Massachusetts of late. See infra Part II.B. Even Washington State is considering a ban. 
See H.B. 1926, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015) (restricting noncompetition 
agreements). Hawaii recently passed legislation prohibiting non-competes for any 
employee of a “technology business.” See 2015 Haw. Sess. Laws 158.  
 15 See Moffat, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, supra note 10, at 943 
(proposing a uniform state law). 
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To date, scholars have focused their attention on California’s climate 
for innovation as it compares to Massachusetts, and to a lesser extent 
other states with innovative industrial districts.16 Curiously, one state 
seldom gets discussed: the state of Washington.17 This omission stands 
out because Washington equals California as a launching pad for 
innovation; it also stands out because non-competes are enforceable in 
Washington. If banning non-competes provides California with its 
comparative advantage, then why has Washington been able to 
provide an equally attractive climate for innovation with a completely 
different approach?18 
The answer is that technology businesses seldom enforce non-
competes — in other words, non-competes are very leaky.19 My 
 
 16 See, e.g., Jason S. Wood, A Comparison of the Enforceability of Covenants Not to 
Compete and Recent Economic Histories of Four High Technology Regions, 5 VA. J.L. & 
TECH. 14 (2000) (comparing California, Massachusetts, Texas, and North Carolina, 
and concluding that Gilson’s theory about the importance of a ban on non-competes is 
not borne out by the evidence from Texas or North Carolina); Christine O’Malley, 
Note, Covenants Not to Compete in the Massachusetts Hi-Tech Industry: Assessing the 
Need for a Legislative Solution, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1215 (1999) (focusing on policy 
concerns and non-compete governance in Massachusetts and suggesting options for 
legislative action). 
 17 The two primary exceptions are: Susan E. Corisis, Note, Postemployment 
Restrictive Covenants: Client Base Protection in Washington, 65 WASH. L. REV. 209, 209-
15 (1990); Sarah J. Taylor, Comment, Fostering Economic Growth in the High-
Technology Field: Washington Should Abandon Its Recognition of the Inevitable Disclosure 
Doctrine, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 473, 473 (2007). Occasionally, Washington gets 
mentioned briefly in the context of the lawsuit between Google and Microsoft over 
Google’s hiring of Kai-Fu Lee. See, e.g., Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The 
Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative 
Policy Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 107, 107-10 (2008) (describing briefly the 
Washington court’s narrow reading of Lee’s Microsoft Employment Agreement that 
allowed for a “preliminary injunction restricting Lee’s activities” but did not keep Lee 
from working for Google). 
 18 See Norman D. Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave Your Employer: Relative Enforcement 
of Covenants Not to Compete, Trends, and Implications for Employee Mobility Policy, 13 
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 751, 786-87 (2011) [hereinafter Fifty Ways to Leave] (rating each 
state’s enforceability strength); Mark J. Garmaise, Ties That Truly Bind: Noncompetition 
Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 376, 
420 (2009) (rating each state’s enforceability strength using a different measure than 
Professor Bishara). 
 19 Scholars have noted leakiness in various other intellectual property contexts. 
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19 (discussing 
leakiness in patents); R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual 
Property and Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995 (2003) (discussing 
leakiness in intellectual property contexts); Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 617, 620 (2008) (suggesting an “opt-in” copyright enforcement system where 
copyright owners must give notice “before the usage of a work becomes infringing”); 
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research shows that Washington’s technology employers engage in 
regular economically rational selective enforcement; and Washington’s 
knowledge workers engage in systematic, intelligent, efficient breach 
of non-competes. Despite an on-paper right to enforce non-competes, 
knowledge workers move freely from one technology business to 
another in Washington just as they do in California, except when an 
employer is faced with a significant threat of trade secret disclosure. It 
is fair to say that in Washington’s technology sector, non-competes do 
not regularly prevent spillovers of useful information but do, 
periodically, protect critical trade secrets. 
Taking a fresh look at California’s approach to non-competes seems 
especially apt now that we know California’s story about freedom of 
employee movement is far less rosy than previously thought. Recent 
litigation by employees at Adobe, Apple, Google, Intel, Intuit, 
LucasFilm, and Pixar Animation revealed secret promises between top 
technology businesses in California not to poach key employees.20 
These promises not to poach21 were pursued aggressively by 
 
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Modern Technology, Leaky Copyrights, and Claims of 
Harm: Insights from the Curious History of Photocopying, 61 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1 
(2013) (arguing that some “leaks” in the copyright system are permissible and that 
“adequate copyright protection does not mean virtually airtight control over works by 
their owners”). This leakiness occurs despite concerns that the threat of enforcing 
non-competes creates a chilling effect on employees who respect contractual 
obligations or fear legal complications. See infra Part III. For sources describing this 
concern, see Richard P. Rita Pers. Servs. Int’l, Inc. v. Kot, 191 S.E.2d 79, 81 (Ga. 1972) 
(declining to apply the severance theory to an unenforceable restrictive covenant); 
Reddy v. Cmty. Health Found. of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906, 916 (W. Va. 1982) (detailing 
what the employer must show for a presumptively enforceable non-compete and what 
the employee can show to rebut the presumptive enforceability); Arnow-Richman, 
Cubewrap Contracts, supra note 5, at 963 (exploring courts’ approach to non-competes 
and suggesting that the “rules of enforcement might be reshaped to avoid dilution of 
employee bargaining power and encourage better contracting practices on the part of 
employers”); Blake, supra note 3, at 682-83 (acknowledging the possibility of in 
terrorem effects of non-competes but arguing that courts need discretion through a 
“general approach” to “tailor the covenant to provide such protection with a 
minimum burden to the employee” where the restraints on the employee are generally 
fair and designed to protect the employer’s legitimate interests); Moffat, The Wrong 
Tool, supra note 10, at 888-90 (discussing the in terrorem effects of employer 
overreach in non-competes). 
 20 See David Streitfeld, In Silicon Valley Thriller, a Settlement May Preclude the 
Finale, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2014, at B1. An intriguing question — beyond the scope 
of this Article — is whether California’s ban on non-competes contributed in any 
measure to the anti-poaching behavior. In other words, if California had a leaky non-
compete infrastructure, would companies have seen the same need to engage in the 
anti-poaching tactics? 
 21 See generally David K. Haase & Darren M. Mungerson, Agreements Between 
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executives at the highest levels of the company, including by Steve 
Jobs of Apple and Eric Schmidt of Google.22 
This Article explores Washington State’s legal infrastructure for 
innovation as a case study, focusing on the impact of non-competes on 
so-called “creative workers” — those who create and invent in the 
information economy.23 It shows how Washington achieves the 
advantages of liberal employee mobility and regular knowledge 
spillovers without the downsides of a flat-out ban on non-competes. 
The Washington way may be superior to California’s approach 
because Washington gives employers a tool of last resort against 
threats of trade secret disclosure by key employees that California 
lacks.24 The point of this Article is not that Washington is exceptional; 
the point is that states do not need to ban non-competes in order to 
foster innovation as many scholars have contended. Washington’s 
leaky non-compete legal infrastructure is exemplary, but other states 
can offer (and perhaps already do offer)25 an inviting legal platform for 
innovation without banning non-competes by taking steps to assure 
that non-compete enforcement is leaky. I offer several proposals in 
this Article to improve beneficial leakiness in every state by addressing 
the potential chilling effect of non-competes. 
To be clear, I do not advocate for unfettered and indiscriminate use 
of non-competes.26 Commentators have rightly condemned this 
 
Employers Not to Hire Each Other’s Employees: When Are They Enforceable?, 21 LAB. 
LAW. 277, 277-302 (2006) (comparing courts’ “antitrust,” contracts in “restraint on 
trade,” and “restrictive covenant” approaches to validity of “no-switching” 
agreements); David L. Johnson, The Parameters of “Solicitation” in an Era of Non-
Solicitation Covenants, 28 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 99 (2012) (providing national case 
survey of enforceable and unenforceable non-solicitation agreements for prior 
customers and former co-workers). 
 22 See David Streitfeld, Tech Giants Settle Antitrust Hiring Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 
2014, at B1. 
 23 See Bishara, Covenants Not to Compete, supra note 7, at 315-16 (distinguishing 
“creative” workers from “service” workers who also have high levels of education but 
are engaged in providing services to other elements of the knowledge economy). 
 24 Although California law may provide an equivalent tool as an exception to its 
ban on non-competes, recent cases have cast doubt on its availability, but this Article 
argues that California should embrace that “exception” as discussed infra Parts I–IV. 
 25 Further research likely will reveal that states other than Washington also have a 
leaky non-compete legal infrastructure but some evidence suggests that not all states 
do at the present time. See Ruth Simon & Angus Loten, Litigation over Noncompete 
Clauses Is Rising, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 14, 2013, 8:06 PM ET), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB10001424127887323446404579011501388418552 (reporting on research 
conducted for the WSJ by the law firm of Beck Reed Riden showing that since 2002 
non-compete cases rose 61% across the U.S. to 760 published cases). 
 26 See Froma Harrop, To Keep Good Workers, Some Employers Are Trapping Them, 
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practice for a multitude of good reasons and courts have the tools and 
should have the will to refuse enforcement in these cases. Instead, I 
show the value of targeted enforcement of non-competes when the 
loss of trade secrets is genuinely at risk.27 
Following this Introduction, Part I introduces the law of non-
competes in the United States, including the commonly used “rule of 
reason” approach and California’s ban on non-competes. Part II 
presents the rising crescendo for states to adopt California’s approach 
to non-competes, as states compete to attract and retain technology-
related businesses. Part II explains how this trend began with 
Professor Gilson’s influential article but has been fueled by recent 
scholarship that draws on business management and behavioral 
science research. Part III describes Washington’s law on non-
competes, presents research showing how the actual enforcement of 
non-competes in Washington’s technology sector is very leaky, and 
explains the pragmatic reasons for the leakiness. Part III also addresses 
why the potential chilling effects of non-compete litigation are less 
significant than scholars might fear. Part III concludes by showing 
how a leaky approach to non-compete enforcement creates a useful 
legal infrastructure for innovation that is on par with California’s 
approach and indeed provides some notable advantages for protecting 
valuable trade secrets. Using insights from the Washington case study, 
Part IV outlines a series of proposals directed to courts and legislators 
in every state to reduce potential chilling effects of non-competes and 
improve the state’s legal infrastructure for innovation. It also explains 
why California should embrace the so-called “trade secret exception” 
to its ban on non-competes in order to improve California’s legal 
 
SEATTLE TIMES, June 7, 2015, at A13 (“Originally designed to stop tech whizzes from taking 
company secrets to higher bidders, these noncompete agreements are being forced on 
workers loading boxes at warehouses or assembling sandwiches so that they can’t go to the 
warehouse or sandwich shop down the block.”); Danny Westneat, Low-Paying Job Includes 
Noncompete Clause, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 12, 2014, at B1 (commenting on reports of non-
competes used at Seattle’s ServiceMaster water damage cleaner and the Jimmy John’s 
sandwich shop: “It’s hard to conjure what intellectual property or trade secrets are at stake 
in making the Turkey Tom. Or wet-vaccing carpets. It’s one thing to make engineers or 
lawyers sign noncompetes. But cleaners?”); Ray Henry, Scrutiny on Worker Non-Compete 
Deals, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 3, 2015, 8:32 PM EST), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ 
76a057287c844f59a3bee39be9926395/scrutiny-worker-non-compete-deals (reporting on 
non-competes at Jimmy John’s sandwich shop and Super Maid housecleaning services). 
 27 Unfortunately, the unfettered and indiscriminate use of non-competes gives 
legitimate uses a bad name (getting a bad name happens in copyright law as well). See 
Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 61, 
61-62 (2002). Thus, this Article proposes several ways to deter the heavy-handed uses 
of non-competes. See infra Part IV for a discussion of these proposals. 
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infrastructure for start-ups and established firms that rely on robust 
trade secret protection. 
I. THE LAW OF COVENANTS-NOT-TO-COMPETE 
A. English Origins 
A covenant-not-to-compete forbids a departing employee from 
competing with a former employer either as an employee of an 
established rival firm or by starting a new firm.28 Non-competes have 
become ubiquitous in employment contracts for highly skilled 
employees who work in the software and information technology 
sector.29 However, non-competes did not originate in the modern 
information economy. 
Non-competes can be traced back to the master-apprentice 
relationship in England. In this relationship, the master invested time 
and effort in training an apprentice in the skills of a trade and the 
apprentice, in turn, provided services back to the master for a specified 
period of time.30 If the apprentice left early to compete against the 
master, British courts of equity enforced non-competes to enable the 
 
 28 Google, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 415 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2005) 
(“While employed at Microsoft and for a period of one year thereafter, I will not (a) 
accept employment or engage in activities competitive with products, services, or 
projects (including actual or demonstrably anticipated research or development) on 
which I worked or about which I learned confidential or proprietary information or 
trade secrets while employed at Microsoft . . . .”). 
 29 According to one commentator, it is “generally and logically assumed that non-
compete clauses in employment contracts are widely utilized. However, there is not 
much evidence available on this point.” Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave, supra note 18, at 
759-60; see also Norman D. Bishara, Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas, An 
Empirical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses and Other Restrictive Postemployment 
Covenants, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015) (empirical study of the prevalence of non-
competes for CEOs of 500 large companies); Garmaise, supra note 18, at 396 
(reporting evidence that 70.2% of top executives sign noncompetes); Matt Marx, The 
Firm Strikes Back: Non-Compete Agreements and the Mobility of Technical Professionals, 
76 AM. SOC. REV. 695, 700 (2011) (interviews with small sample of high tech 
workers); Samila & Sorenson, supra note 10, at 425 (citing surveys finding that nearly 
90% of technical workers and upper level management sign non-competes); Stewart J. 
Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: 
What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 234 (2006) 
(concluding that non-competes are widely used for CEOs at large public companies).  
 30 See Blake, supra note 3, at 625-46 (reviewing the extensive history of restrictive 
employment covenants); see also Dan Messeloff, Note, Give the Green Light to Silicon 
Alley Employees: No-Compete Agreements Between Internet Companies and Employees 
Under New York Law, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 711, 711-23 
(2001) (providing a historical account). 
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master to protect the master’s training investment. Over time, when 
enforcement of non-competes became too harsh, English courts began 
to hold that employers could only enforce reasonable limitations on 
departing employees.31 
B. Modern American Law: Two Paths 
1. Majority Path: Enforceable When Reasonable 
Most states in the United States follow the English tradition of 
enforcing non-competes if they are reasonable. As in early England, 
non-competes can protect an American employer’s investment in 
training its employees. This training often involves specific technical 
training. In economic terms, non-competes provide an incentive for 
employers to invest in employee training. This benefits employers, of 
course, but also benefits employees who, ultimately, can deploy their 
new skills elsewhere. Unlike early English law, modern United States 
law does not enforce non-competes simply to protect an employer’s 
investment in human capital. This interest is not compelling enough 
to outweigh the employee’s strong interest in freedom of movement 
and the right to earn a living.32 
The modern rationale for enforcing non-competes goes beyond 
protecting an employer’s investment in training. Today, the rationale 
often focuses on the relationship between non-competes and the 
protection of intellectual property, especially trade secrets.33 When 
employees create copyrightable works, patentable inventions, or 
trademarks in the course of their employment, the employer owns this 
intellectual property either by operation of law or through an industry 
standard assignment of rights. Trade secrets present a bigger challenge. 
For one thing, trade secret protection lasts only as long as the 
information remains secret.34 If a departing employee discloses the 
information to a competitor, then the secret is irretrievably lost. This 
may be particularly devastating if the trade secret provides the 
comparative advantage that the employer has (or had) over its 
 
 31 See Blake, supra note 3, at 638-39. 
 32 See Anenson, supra note 6, at 118. 
 33 See Blake, supra note 3, at 668-71. But see Moffat, The Wrong Tool, supra note 
10, at 898 (arguing that “the IP justification fails. Noncompetes are simply the wrong 
tool for the IP job”). 
 34 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985) (trade secret protection 
exists only for information not generally known); see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS 
§ 757(b) (1939).  
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competitor. For another thing, because some trade secret information 
resides only (or primarily) in the mind of the employee, this 
information may be lost to the employer if the employee leaves 
without documenting the information. Finally, it is often difficult to 
separate an employee’s general skill and knowledge from an 
employer’s trade secret. In light of this ambiguity, a non-compete 
provides an insurance policy for the employer against the disclosure of 
intermingled information. As articulated by the Court in 
Comprehensive Technologies International v. Software Artisans, “[w]hen 
an employee has access to confidential and trade secret information 
critical to the success of the employer’s business, the employer has a 
strong interest in enforcing a covenant not to compete because other 
legal remedies often prove inadequate.”35 
Freedom of contract provides another justification for enforcing 
non-competes. Independent actors should be free to enter into 
agreements of their choosing and courts should not interfere with the 
substance of those agreements absent procedural or substantive 
unconscionability. In the context of non-competes, however, 
American law has departed from a slavish application of this principle. 
It recognizes that employment agreements are rarely negotiated, that 
employees often lack sophistication and bargaining power, and that 
consideration is often inadequate or absent.36 
Drawing on these guiding principles, states enforce non-competes 
tempered by a rule of reason.37 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
 
 35 Comprehensive Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d 730, 739 (4th 
Cir. 1993) vacated on petition for reh’g (1993); see also James P. Pooley, Update on 
Trade Secret Law, INTELL. PROP. COUNS., Oct. 2008, at 5 available at http://media. 
mofo.com/docs/pdf/081009Pooley.pdf (stating covenants restricting an employee’s 
right to compete following termination are one way to avoid the cost and 
unpredictability of trade secret litigation). 
 36 See Blake, supra note 3, at 647-50. 
 37 Some states (about 30%) address non-competes by statute and the others 
through common law. See generally BRIAN M. MALSBERGER, COVENANTS NOT TO 
COMPETE, A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (4th ed. 2004 & Supp. 2014) (analyzing non-
compete case law across the nation with particular emphasis on significant splits of 
authority); KURT E. DECKER, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2004) 
(detailing protectable interests in non-competes through a step-by-step litigation 
guide). For a statutory approach, see COL. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113(2) (2015) (widely 
permitting non-competes for executive and management level employees); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (2015) (restricting non-competes to two years or less within a 
specific geographic area); see also Melissa Ilyse Rassas, Comment, Explaining the 
Outlier: Oregon’s New Non-Compete Agreement Law & The Broadcast Industry, 11 U. PA. 
J. BUS. L. 447, 450-52 (2009). 
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CONTRACTS captures the general38 approach: in considering whether 
to enforce a non-compete, a court must consider (1) whether “the 
restraint is greater than needed to protect the [employer’s] legitimate 
interest”; (2) the “hardship to the [employee]”; and (3) “the likely 
injury to the public.”39 Each state reflects the RESTATEMENT’s 
formulation differently, as illustrated below by the tests in New York 
and Virginia (the tests for Massachusetts, North Carolina, Texas, and 
Washington will be discussed infra in Sections II and III): 
In New York, a restraint is reasonable only if it: (1) is not 
greater than necessary for the protection of the legitimate 
interest of the employer, (2) does not impose undue hardship 
on the employee, and (3) is not injurious to the public. A non-
compete must also be reasonable temporally and 
geographically.40 
In Virginia, (1) covenants in restraint of trade are not favored, 
will be strictly construed and, in the event of an ambiguity, 
will be construed in favor of the employee; and (2) the 
employer bears the burden to show that the restraint is no 
greater than necessary to protect a legitimate business interest, 
is not unduly harsh or oppressive in curtailing an employee’s 
ability to earn a livelihood, and is reasonable in light of sound 
public policy.41 
To implement the rule of reason, many courts will reform an 
unreasonable non-compete contract.42 Some courts do this by excising 
unreasonable terms and then enforcing reasonable terms that remain, 
provided the covenant remains grammatically coherent.43 This is 
 
 38 Some scholars describe state non-compete law as nuanced but relatively 
consistent over time. See Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave, supra note 18, at 754. Other 
scholars characterize this diversity as “a mess.” See Moffat, Making Non-Competes 
Unenforceable, supra note 10, at 943. 
 39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1981). 
 40 See Natural Organics, Inc. v. Kirkendall, 860 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143 (App. Div. 2008). 
 41 See Modern Env’ts, Inc. v. Stinnett, 561 S.E.2d 694, 696 (Va. 2002). 
 42 Statutes in Florida, Michigan, and Texas specifically allow a court to reform a 
non-compete. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.335(1) (2015); MICH. COMP. LAW ANN. 
§ 445.774a (2015); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51(c) (2015). See generally 
Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Putting the Blue Pencil Down: An Argument for Specificity in 
Noncompete Agreements, 86 NEB. L. REV. 672 (2008) (describing the various 
permutations of the blue pencil doctrine and outlining the arguments for and against 
each approach).  
 43 Wisconsin, by contrast, voids any overbroad non-compete. See WIS. STAT. 
§ 103.465 (2015). 
  
264 University of California, Davis [Vol. 49:251 
known as the “blue pencil” approach.44 Other courts will simply 
enforce the non-compete only to the extent it is reasonable. This is 
known as the partial enforcement approach.45 
Moreover, some states require additional consideration for non-
competes entered into once the employment relationship has begun. 
In these states, continued employment is not sufficient 
consideration.46 This adds an additional hurdle for employers who 
seek, even for legitimate reasons, to restrain employee mobility. 
In sum, modern American law on non-competes has not strayed too 
far from its roots in the English law of equity.47 American courts do 
not enforce non-competes unequivocally but, instead, they look for a 
business justification that outweighs the individual rights of the 
employee to work and to move, and the public’s interest in keeping 
the skill of the employee productively employed in the economy.48 As 
in English courts of equity, non-competes can be enforced in the 
United States, but not if they are too harsh (for individuals or society). 
2. California’s Path: Never Enforceable 
Initially, California followed the common law rule that non-
competes are valid as long as they are reasonably imposed.49 However, 
in 1872 California changed course, settling on a public policy that 
favored unfettered competition and employee mobility.50 The 
legislature enacted this policy in then Civil Code Section 833 (now 
California Business and Professions Code section 16600): “Except as 
provided in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained 
 
 44 See Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Components, Inc., 968 F.2d 1463, 
1469 (1st Cir. 1992) (describing the blue pencil approach). 
 45 Id. (describing the partial enforcement approach). 
 46 See, e.g., Stevenson v. Parsons, 384 S.E.2d 291, 293 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) 
(describing covenants not to compete in North Carolina); George W. Kistler, Inc. v. 
O’Brien, 347 A.2d 311, 316 (Pa. 1975) (describing covenants not to compete in 
Pennsylvania); Labriola v. Pollard Grp., Inc., 100 P.3d 791, 794-96 (Wash. 2004) 
(describing covenants not to compete in Washington). 
 47 See Blake, supra note 3, at 630-31, 643-46. 
 48 See, e.g., Systems & Software, Inc. v. Barnes, 886 A.2d 762, 764 (Vt. 2005) 
(“We have stated that ‘we will proceed with caution’ when asked to enforce covenants 
against competitive employment because such restraints run counter to public policy 
favoring the right of individuals to engage in the commercial activity of their 
choice.”). 
 49 See Wright v. Ryder, 36 Cal. 342, 357 (1868). 
 50 Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 288-91 (Cal. 2008).  
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from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is 
to that extent void.”51 
Section 16600 did not result from the foresight of the California 
legislature, but instead, can be traced to the nineteenth century 
codification movement in American law led by David Dudley Field 
and his “Field Code.”52 The California Supreme Court has ruled that 
Section 16600 “prohibits employee noncompetition agreements unless 
the agreement falls within a statutory exception.”53 California’s strong 
rule against the enforceability of non-competes has been replicated in 
Hawaii, North Dakota, Montana, and Oklahoma54 although the courts 
in Montana and Oklahoma have interpreted their statutes to permit 
the enforcement of non-competes in certain circumstances.55 Although 
not going as far as California, Colorado and Oregon limit enforcement 
of non-competes to managers and professional workers.56 
II. THE RISING CRESCENDO FOR THE CALIFORNIA APPROACH 
A. Professor Saxenian, Professor Gilson, and Mr. Wood 
Scholars have identified the key conditions that incubate high 
technology innovation in a region. The consensus factors include a 
significant university or research center, access to capital, a robust 
 
 51 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Ann. § 16600 (2015); see also Gilson, supra note 8, at 
613-19. 
 52 See Gilson, supra note 8, at 613-14 (noting the role of “serendipity” and 
“historical accident” in the enactment of section 16600 and observing “It is impossible 
to know exactly what Field had in mind in this sequence”). See generally LAWRENCE 
M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 391 (2d ed. 1985) (describing Field’s 
codification efforts). 
 53 Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d at 288; see also Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley 
Corp., 398 P.2d 147, 149 (Cal. 1965). The “statutory exceptions” apply to 
noncompetition agreements in the sale or dissolution of corporations (16601), 
partnerships (16602), and limited liability corporations (16602.5). 
 54 See 2015 Haw. Sess. Laws 158 (prohibiting non-competes for employees of 
technology businesses); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 (2015); N.D. CENT. CODE. § 9-
08-06 (2015); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 217 (2015); see also GA. CONST. art III, § 6, para. 
V(c) (prohibiting the general assembly from authorizing contracts that inhibit 
competition).  
 55 See Dobbins v. Rutherford, 708 P.2d 577, 579 (Mont. 1985); Thayne A Hedges Reg’l 
Speech & Hearing Ctr., Inc. v. Baughman, 996 P.2d 939, 941 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998). 
 56 COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113(d) (2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(1)(a)–(b) 
(2015). Since highly skilled employees contribute the most to knowledge spillovers, 
Oregon’s and Colorado’s approaches protect low skilled workers from unfair 
treatment but do not address the key issue addressed in this article. 
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infrastructure, and an environment for a high quality of life.57 
Following in this line of research, Professor AnnaLee Saxenian, a 
sociologist, studied the rise of Silicon Valley’s high-technology sector 
during the 1980’s as it compared to the relative stagnation of the 
Route 128 region of Massachusetts.58 Saxenian’s focus was not on the 
initial conditions needed for innovation, but rather the conditions that 
allow a region to sustain and regenerate innovative activity. Saxenian 
attributed Silicon Valley’s relative success largely to its culture: small 
firms with no fear of failing, frequent employee crossover, and a 
culture of information sharing.59 By contrast, Route 128 was 
dominated by large integrated firms with minimal employee crossover 
and a culture of secrecy.60 The knowledge spillovers that occurred in 
Silicon Valley, in Saxenian’s estimation, fostered its rapid development 
of new technologies and positive economic growth. 
Professor Ronald Gilson built on Saxenian’s work, arguing that 
California’s approach to non-competes provided the legal infrastructure 
for the success of Silicon Valley as a high technology engine.61 Gilson 
pointed out that California’s non-enforcement approach to non-
competes maximizes employee movement between firms and thus 
knowledge spillovers.62 By contrast, Massachusetts follows the rule of 
reason approach to the enforcement of non-competes, which can 
impede knowledge spillovers by restricting employee movement 
 
 57 For recent discussions of these factors, see Maggie Theroux Fieldsteel, Building 
a Successful Technology Cluster, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND 
DEV., ENVTL. TECH. INNOVATION CLUSTERS PROGRAM 14-20 (Mar. 12, 2013) (reviewing 
the factors in the context of three different clusters, defined as “dense regional 
networks of companies, universities, research institutions, and other stakeholders 
involved in a single industry”); Rustam Lalkada, Technology Business Incubation: A 
Toolkit on Innovation in Engineering, Science and Technology, U.N. EDUC., SCI. AND 
CULTURAL ORG. (2006). 
 58 See generally ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND 
COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994) (comparing the technology 
industry in California versus Massachusetts). 
 59 Id. at 2-3, 29-57. 
 60 Id. at 3-4, 59-82. 
 61 Gilson, supra note 8, at 579 (“The different legal rules governing 
postemployment covenants not to compete in California and Massachusetts help 
explain the differences in employee job mobility and therefore the knowledge transfer 
that Saxenian identifies as a critical factor in explaining the differential performance of 
Silicon Valley and Route 128.”). Like most other commentators, Gilson assumed 
without presenting much evidence that use of non-competes was widespread in 
Massachusetts. See id. at 603-06. 
 62 Id.  
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between firms.63 According to Gilson, the critical differentiator between 
Silicon Valley and Route 128 is law not just culture.64 
Professor Gilson’s article has been extremely influential. It is hard to 
find a law review article that does not cite Gilson or use his article as a 
point of departure.65 Indeed, the crescendo of scholarly support for 
Gilson’s thesis has been rising in recent years.66 However, significant 
aspects of Gilson’s article are often overlooked. These portions of 
Gilson’s work provide words of caution against a full-fledged embrace 
of California’s approach to non-competes. It is important to highlight 
these points because Gilson’s work is so foundational. 
Gilson did not suggest that California’s approach is right for every 
state. To the contrary, he warned: “. . . I think caution is in order in 
assessing the policy implications of Silicon Valley’s history.”67 He ends 
his article with this advice: “[t]hus, it may well be that a state 
concerned with regional developments today should not blindly seek 
to replicate the historical source of Silicon Valley’s success. Given the 
opportunity to act by design rather than by historical accident, the 
better approach may be to craft a legal infrastructure that has the 
flexibility to accommodate the different balance between external 
economies and intellectual property rights protection that may be 
optimal in different industries.”68 
And what legal infrastructure might accommodate this important 
“flexibility?” Gilson suggests: “[r]ather than emulating California’s 
blanket prohibition (which, after all, exists by historical accident not 
design), it may be that the rule of reason currently applied to post-
employment covenants . . . is flexible enough . . . In assessing the 
validity of a particular covenant under this legal regime, a court 
balances against the employer’s interest in enforcing the covenant not 
only the employee’s interest in mobility, but also the public interest.”69 
 
 63 Id. at 603-08. 
 64 Id. at 594. 
 65 See, e.g., Bishara, Martin & Thomas, supra note 29, at 14 (citing Gilson and 
remarking “Perhaps the most active discussion regarding the propriety of [non-
competes] relates to the well-known academic argument that the economic growth of 
Silicon Valley was made possible in part because of California’s ban on 
noncompetes”); Garrison & Wendt, supra note 17, at 170-171 (providing brief 
synopsis of Professor Gilson’s arguments). 
 66 See Bishara, Martin & Thomas, supra note 29, at 15 (referring to the “burst of 
recent scholarship” about the California effect); see also infra Part II.B (describing 
recent scholarship urging a California approach). 
 67 Gilson, supra note 8, at 627. 
 68 Id. at 629. 
 69 Id. at 628. 
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Professor Gilson was not the only one examining the effect of non-
competes on innovation at that time. Mr. Jason S. Wood, an attorney 
in North Carolina, published an article the year after Gilson’s piece, 
comparing Silicon Valley not only to Route 128, but also to high tech 
hotbeds in Austin, Texas (“Austin”) and North Carolina’s Research 
Triangle Park (“RTP”).70 Compared to the fame of Gilson’s article, 
Wood’s work has been largely ignored by scholars,71 but it is highly 
instructive. 
Wood acknowledged that Gilson had described significant 
differences in the histories and legal infrastructure of Silicon Valley 
and Route 128. However, Wood suggested that the predictive 
usefulness of California’s approach to non-competes could be tested 
by comparing it with other thriving high technology sectors such as 
Austin and the RTP as well as Route 128. Thus, Wood’s article first 
analyzed the law of non-competes in California, Massachusetts, Texas, 
and North Carolina, and then evaluated whether the enforcement 
posture of each state’s law tracked the relative vibrancy of each state’s 
high tech sector. 
Wood noted that Texas and North Carolina, like Massachusetts, 
take a rule of reason approach to enforcing non-competes. Both Texas 
and North Carolina test the reasonableness of a non-compete by 
considering the typical factors.72 However, Wood pointed out some 
differences of note. North Carolina’s courts go farther in protecting 
employees by requiring that the non-compete be signed, in writing, 
and entered into at the time and as part of the contract of 
employment.73 North Carolina’s pro-employee twist may be offset, 
according to Wood, by the tendency of North Carolina’s courts to 
grant injunctive relief in non-compete cases upon showing a 
likelihood of success on the merits without proof of actual harm.74 
 
 70 Wood, supra note 16, at 26-28. 
 71 According to a LEXIS search on January 26, 2015, Professor Gilson’s article has 
been cited 182 times compared to 17 citations to Mr. Wood’s article. 
 72 Namely, whether (1) the restraint is reasonable to protect the employer’s 
legitimate business interest; (2) the scope of the restraint is reasonable; (3) valuable 
consideration is given; and (4) the covenant is consistent with public policy in North 
Carolina. See United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 370 S.E.2d 375, 379-81 (N.C. 1988); 
Kadis v. Britt, 29 S.E.2d 543, 545-49 (N.C. 1944); see also Welcome Wagon v. Morris, 
224 F.2d 693, 698 (4th Cir. 1955) (collecting North Carolina cases on non-competes). 
In Texas the rule of reason test is codified. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(a) 
(2015). 
 73 See Triangle Leasing Co. v. McMahon, 393 S.E.2d 854, 857-58 (N.C. 1990); 
Whittaker Gen. Med. Corp. v. Daniel, 379 S.E.2d 824, 826-28 (N.C. 1989). 
 74 See A.E.P. Indus., Inc. v. McClure, 302 S.E.2d 754, 759-60 (N.C. 1983); see also 
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Texas courts, on the other hand, often seem unwilling to enforce non-
competes in practice even though they are clearly enforceable under 
state law, including Texas statutory law.75 Wood’s bottom line is that if 
you put the four states on a spectrum, Massachusetts’ legal 
infrastructure for non-competes would be the most restrictive of 
knowledge spillovers, followed by North Carolina, Texas, and 
California.76 Based on that spectrum, Wood compared the relative rate 
of growth in each state to see whether the state growth rates followed 
the restrictiveness pattern. 
Wood found that Silicon Valley, Austin, and the RTP had all 
experienced very high levels of economic success and all were 
experiencing similar relative growth spurts, but just at different orders 
of magnitude.77 The same held true for venture capital dollars invested 
and venture capital deals completed — similar relative growth across 
regions.78 He also found that Route 128 had recovered its momentum.79 
In the final analysis, Wood concluded that “. . . it would appear that the 
results one would expect from the effects of Gilson’s theory are being 
obscured by other factors, or that his argument does not possess 
significant predictive value and may not play quite the significant role 
that he would suggest.”80 Wood called for additional study over a longer 
period of time to determine which factors truly correlated with creating 
a multigenerational economy of technological innovation.81 
 
John Reid Parker, Jr., Injunctive Russian Roulette and Employment Noncompetition 
Cases: A.E.P. Industries, Inc. v. McClure, 63 N.C. L. REV. 222, 223-27 (1984). Even 
after the Supreme Court’s eBay decision, it may be easier to get pre-trial injunctive 
relief in a trade secret case than in a copyright or patent case. See Core Labs. LP v. 
Spectrum Tracer Servs., LLC, 532 Fed. App’x. 904, 907-11 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 75 See Wood, supra note 16, at 36. 
 76 See id. In comparison, Professor Bishara also put non-compete enforceability on 
a spectrum, rating each state’s enforceability strength on a scale of 1 to 51, with 51 
signaling the weakest enforcement. See Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave, supra note 18, at 
787. California received a score of 50, North Carolina scored 35, Texas 32, and 
Massachusetts 18. Id. In Professor Garmaise’s “Noncompetition Enforceability Index,” 
California received a score of 0, Texas 3, North Carolina 4, and Massachusetts 6. See 
Garmaise, supra note 18, at 420. 
 77 Wood, supra note 16, at 44, 48, 58. 
 78 See id. at 51. 
 79 Id. at 39, 44, 51. Wood pointed out that many Silicon Valley firms had 
established large presences in the Boston area to benefit from Boston’s resurgence. See 
id. at 39. 
 80 Id. at 51. 
 81 Id. at 65 (suggesting that research should occur over the span of at least an 
entire technological life cycle). 
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B. Recent Scholarship Urging a California Approach 
Scholars continue to clamor for a move to the California approach.82 
For example, Professor Viva Moffat (like many other scholars) argues 
that non-competes are the product of an inherently flawed bargaining 
process that has the potential to create harmful chilling effects on 
employees.83 She goes farther, however, arguing that non-competes 
cannot be justified as a tool to protect trade secrets or other intangible 
assets because non-competes fundamentally upset the balance 
inherent in trade secret law by extending protection farther than the 
law provides on its own.84 Finally, Professor Moffat argues that the 
diversity of approaches to enforcement of non-competes in states 
applying the rule of reason has become so muddled and unproductive 
that the states should adopt a uniform rule of unenforceability of non-
competes based on the California model.85 
Recently, scholars have gone beyond legal and policy-based 
arguments to hold up the advantages of the California model, drawing 
on business management, economics, sociology, and organizational 
research.86 Professor Orly Lobel, for example, relies heavily on this 
research in a recent book87 and introduces her own experimental 
behavioral study in a recent article.88 Some business management 
 
 82 California’s ban on non-competes does not always benefit California as creative 
workers can and do flow to firms in other states. See Tim Higgins & Dana Hull, Want 
Elon Musk to Hire You at Tesla? Work for Apple, BLOOMBERG BUS. NEWS (Feb. 5, 2015, 
2:28 PM PST), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-05/want-elon-musk-
to-hire-you-at-tesla-work-for-apple?cmpid=yhoo (describing Nevada-based Tesla’s 
hiring of California-based Apple designers). 
 83 See Moffat, The Wrong Tool, supra note 10, at 885-99. 
 84 See id. at 911-21. 
 85 See Moffat, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, supra note 10, at 965-84. 
 86 Amir & Lobel, supra note 6, at 860 (concluding that the results of a study by 
management scholars “clearly support the existence of a ‘California effect’ — a growth 
advantage for states that do not enforce noncompetes”); Matt Marx, Deborah 
Strumsky & Lee Fleming, Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Non-Compete Experiment, 
55 MGMT. SCI. 875, 879-87 (2009); Moffat, The Wrong Tool, supra note 10, at 896-98 
(discussing social science studies); see also Garmaise, supra note 18, at 380-414; 
Samila & Sorenson, supra note 10, at 428-29; Toby E. Stuart & Olav Sorenson, 
Liquidity Events and the Geographic Distribution of Entrepreneurial Activity, 48 ADMIN. 
SCI. Q. 175, 176-78 (2003) (drawing on organizational demography and sociologically 
informed literature).  
 87 See Amir & Lobel, supra note 6, at 837-38; Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive 
Property: Human Capital Law and the Reach of Intellectual Property, 93 TEX. L. REV. 789, 
825-28, 840-42, 846-48 (2015). See generally LOBEL, supra note 6 (describing Lobel’s 
recent research regarding trade secrets and non-competes). 
 88 Amir & Lobel, supra note 6, at 852-68.  
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scholars cast doubt on the predictive qualities of this research,89 but 
the crescendo for the California approach seems to be rising as states 
look for a comparative advantage in creating a haven for innovation.90 
An organization called the Alliance for Open Competition (“AOC”) 
has been lobbying nationwide for a ban on the enforcement of non-
competes.91 Most prominently, AOC has been supporting efforts to 
change the law in Massachusetts for Route 128, resulting in legislative 
activity focused on passage of California-style legislation.92 
But should all states ban non-competes? Is that the best way to 
facilitate knowledge spillovers and stimulate innovation or is there a 
better way? Have Gilson’s words of caution about California’s 
approach been put to rest and Wood’s call for additional research been 
satisfied? As previously noted, many scholars now think that the 
answer is a resounding “yes,” but before reaching that conclusion, let’s 
examine a previously unexplored but particularly relevant real world 
case study in legal infrastructure: the law, and most importantly, the 
practice of enforcing non-competes in the state of Washington. 
The next Part begins by showing that Washington rivals California as 
a state for innovators. It then describes Washington’s law of non-
 
 89 “Stepping back and examining these studies as a group from a legal scholarship 
perspective reveals some inconsistencies and shortcomings of the basis for these 
empirical studies . . . . Moreover, the verdict on the importance of noncompete law 
and mobility policy — in terms of helping or harming business activity or workers’ 
rights — and the role of noncompetes in key issues such as mobility of all types of 
workers and knowledge transfer is not yet clear.” Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave, supra 
note 18, at 767-68. See also id. at 759-67 (surveying and analyzing the research).  
 90 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 91 The AOC “is a group of entrepreneurs, employees, investors and executives 
dedicated to fostering innovation throughout the US. We seek to breakdown a major 
barrier to entrepreneurialism: the use of non-competition agreements mandated by 
employers that force employees to sign away their rights to engage in any business of a 
competitive nature when they leave their present jobs.” ALLIANCE FOR OPEN 
COMPETITION, supra note 14.  
 92 See also Carolyn Y. Johnson, Contract Clauses Called Stifling: Sparking Capital 
Asks Patrick to Eliminate Noncompete Accords, BOSTON.COM (Dec. 7, 2007), 
http://www.boston.com/business/technology/articles/2007/12/07/contract_clauses_ 
called_stifling/. See generally Scott Kirsner, Dear Captains of Industry: Where Is the 
Data to Support Your Position on Noncompetes?, BOSTON.COM (Aug. 4, 2009, 7:20 AM), 
http://www.boston.com/business/technology/innoeco/2009/08/dear_captains_of_industry
_wher.html (discussing proposed legislation in Massachusetts to make non-competes 
less restrictive and make sure employees are more informed about non-competes). 
Legislation to ban non-competes has also been active in Washington State. See Todd 
Bishop, Cracking Down on Non-Compete Deals: Bill Would Change Wash. State Law to 
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competes, presents research suggesting that enforcement of non-
competes is very leaky in practice, and explains the pragmatic reasons 
for the leakiness. This Part also addresses why the potential chilling 
effects of non-competes are less significant than scholars fear. Finally, it 
explains why Washington’s leaky enforcement approach to non-
competes is superior to California’s non-enforcement approach because 
it better balances knowledge spillovers and trade secret protection. 
III. WASHINGTON AS A PLATFORM FOR INNOVATION AND ITS LEAKY 
NON-COMPETE LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
A. Washington Is a Leading State for Creators and Innovators 
In the past five years, Washington has consistently placed in the top 
10 growing states in terms of size,93 economy,94 technological 
advancement,95 and startup culture.96 This is due in part to Seattle’s 
status as the fastest growing big city in the U.S.97 and one of the top 5 
cities for tech startups.98 In fact, Bloomberg recently declared that 
Washington is the most innovative state in America.99 
Washington ranked first because it did well in all of Bloomberg’s 
categories.100 Bloomberg took into account the percentage of each 
state’s population that worked in STEM fields, the percentage with 
science and technology degrees, the proportion of utility patents 
 
 93 Ilyce Glink, Top 10 Fastest-Growing States, CBS NEWS (Jan. 18, 2014, 6:46 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/media/top-10-fastest-growing-states/3/. 
 94 The 11 States with the Fastest-Growing Economies, DAILY FINANCE, http://www. 
dailyfinance.com/photos/the-states-with-the-fastest-growing-economies/ (last visited 
Aug. 25, 2014). 
 95 The Top 10 States for Technology, CNBC, http://www.cnbc.com/id/48058147/ 
page/6 (last visited Aug. 25, 2014). 
 96 See Emily Coyle, The Top 6 Regions with the Most High-Tech Startups, WALL ST. 
CHEAT SHEET (Nov. 11, 2013), http://wallstcheatsheet.com/stocks/the-top-6-states-
with-the-most-high-tech-startups.html/?a=viewall. 
 97 Gene Balk, Census: Seattle Is the Fastest-Growing Big City in the U.S., SEATTLE 
TIMES (May 22, 2014, 12:05 AM), http://blogs.seattletimes.com/fyi-guy/2014/05/22/ 
census-seattle-is-the-fastest-growing-big-city-in-the-u-s/. 
 98 Catherine Clifford, The 25 Best U.S. Cities for Tech Startups, ENTREPRENEUR 
(Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/227829. 
 99 Dina Bass, Microsoft, Amazon Propel Washington to Most Innovative State, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 18, 2013, 9:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-12-19/ 
microsoft-amazon-propel-washington-to-most-innovative-state.html; Bloomberg Rankings, 
Top 20 Most Innovative States, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 18, 2013, 6:42 PM), http://www. 
bloomberg.com/slideshow/2013-12-18/top-20-most-innovative-states.html#slide21. 
 100 Most Innovative in U.S.: States, supra note 13. 
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granted to its residents, its government spending on research and 
development, the gross state product per employed person, its three-
year change in productivity, and the percentage of its public 
companies focused on technology. California had the highest 
percentage of utility patents granted but had also had a negative three-
year change in productivity. Massachusetts had the highest percentage 
of STEM professionals but a low state government spending rates on 
R&D. Virginia had high percentages of both STEM professionals and 
science degree holders but had a low gross state product per worker 
and a negative three-year productivity change. Texas did well in many 
categories but had noticeably lower percentages of STEM professionals 
and holders of science and technology degrees than other top-ranking 
states. North Carolina had similar results as Texas but had lower gross 
state products per employed person and a three-year productivity 
change that was close to zero. Washington, through a balance of a 
well-educated population, strong economic foundation, and a positive 
future trajectory, has earned Bloomberg’s nod as the most innovative 
state in America.101 
B. Law of Non-Competes in Washington 
Like many other states, Washington has adopted the rule of reason 
approach and wrestled with how to make enforcement of non-
competes as fair as possible for both employers and employees.102 One 
of the earliest Washington Supreme Court cases addressing the 
enforceability of non-compete agreements was Racine v. Bender.103 
Bender was a Certified Public Accountant who worked in Racine’s 
 
 101 See generally Jon Talton, Amazon.com Just Tip of Seattle Boom, SEATTLE TIMES, 
April 19, 2015, at D1, D6 (discussing reasons behind Seattle-area tech boom). 
Technology businesses continue to be attracted to Washington. See Brier Dudley, 
Apple Joins the Party, Opens Seattle Office, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 4, 2014, at A7-A8 
[hereinafter Apple Joins the Party] (reporting that Apple has opened a campus in 
Washington, joining Twitter, Facebook, Google, and Oracle); Brier Dudley, Dropbox 
Dropping into Seattle, Joining Cloud Crowd, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 3, 2014, at A12; Brier 
Dudley, Facebook Likes Seattle in a Big Way with New Digs, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 18, 
2015, at A1, A10 (“New South Lake Union office . . . is doing some of [Facebook’s] 
most forward projects.”); Hanna Hull & Julie Johnsson, SpaceX Chief Has High Hopes 
for Seattle Office, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 14, 2015, at A1 (reporting that Elon Musk will be 
opening a Seattle engineering office to develop and launch space satellites and other 
high technology ventures). 
 102 See generally BRIAN M. MALSBERGER, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE: A STATE-BY-
STATE SURVEY 4619-60 (7th ed. Supp. 2011) (reviewing Washington’s law). 
 103 252 P. 115 (Wash. 1927). 
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accounting company.104 Bender left and started his own accounting 
company, soliciting some of the clients that he had worked for at 
Racine’s company. Racine sought an injunction against Bender, 
claiming that Bender had violated the warranty found at the bottom of 
each report that Bender submitted to Racine.105 This warranty 
contained language that, in modern terms, would be referred to as a 
non-compete. The Supreme Court of Washington stated that these 
restrictions were enforceable “if they meet the test of showing that 
they are not greater than are reasonably necessary to protect the 
business or good will of the employer, even though they restrain the 
employee of his liberty to engage in a certain occupation or business, 
and deprive the public of the services, or restrain trade.”106 
The Supreme Court of Washington then decided Wood v. May.107 In 
that case, Wood took on May as his horseshoeing apprentice and made 
him agree that, if May left or was fired, he would not work in 
horseshoeing or blacksmithing within one hundred miles of Wood for 
five years.108 Using the reasoning from Racine, the Court upheld the non-
compete but agreed with the trial court that the area restriction in the 
agreement was unreasonable because it was “both unduly harsh to 
respondent in curtailing his legitimate efforts to earn a livelihood and 
unnecessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of appellant.”109 
The Court remanded the case to the trial court, ruling that the non-
compete could be reformed by the trial court to make it reasonable (i.e., 
blue penciled) as long as “partial enforcement is possible without injury 
to the public and without injustice to the parties.”110 
The Washington Court of Appeals in Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. 
Wohlman111 distilled the holdings of Racine and Wood into a 3-factor 
test of reasonableness that now has become the standard articulation 
of the test in Washington: “(1) whether restraint is necessary for the 
protection of the business or good will of the employer, (2) whether it 
 
 104 Id. at 115. 
 105 Id. at 116. 
 106 Id. at 116-17. 
 107 438 P.2d 587 (Wash. 1968). 
 108 Id. at 588. 
 109 Id. at 589-90. 
 110 Id. at 591; see also Sheppard v. Blackstock Lumber Co., Inc., 540 P.2d 1373, 
1377 (Wash. 1975) (finding forfeiture clause unreasonable and remanding the case to 
see if the non-compete could be reasonably enforced). 
 111 Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Wohlman, 578 P.2d 530 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1978); see also Amazon, Inc. v. Powers, No. C12-1911RAJ, 2012 WL 6726538, at *8 
(W.D. Wash. Dec. 27, 2012) (stating the three factor test found in the Court of 
Appeals decision). 
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imposes upon the employee any greater restraint than is reasonably 
necessary to secure the business of the employer or the good will 
thereof, and (3) whether the degree of injury to the public is such loss 
of the service and skill of the employee to warrant nonenforcement of 
the covenant.”112 After using this test to evaluate the reasonableness of 
the non-compete, the court is to enforce the agreement only so far as 
is reasonable.113 
More recently, the Supreme Court of Washington addressed the 
type of consideration that is needed for an enforceable non-compete, 
particularly whether continuing employment in an at-will relationship 
suffices.114 In Labriola v. Pollard Group, Inc. the employee had signed a 
non-compete 5 years after being hired, but the employer paid no 
additional compensation for the non-compete.115 The Court held that 
on-going employment is not sufficient consideration for a non-
compete signed after the hiring date nor is on-the-job training when 
the employee comes to the employer with experience and training.116 
In looking at the development of non-compete law in Washington 
over the years, the federal district court in Amazon, Inc. v. Powers 
observed that “Washington courts have typically looked favorably on 
 
 112 Alexander & Alexander, 578 P.2d at 539. 
 113 Id. Cases after Alexander & Alexander include: Perry v. Moran, 748 P.2d 224, 
230 (Wash. 1987) (determining that prohibition on providing accounting services to 
former employer’s clients is less restrictive than geographic limitation); Emerick v. 
Cardiac Study Ctr., Inc., 286 P.3d 689, 693-94 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012) (remanding 
case because trial court had not properly addressed employer’s protectable business 
interest); Copier Specialists, Inc. v. Gillen, 887 P.2d 919, 920 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) 
(affirming trial court’s judgment that training acquired during short-term employment 
“without more, does not warrant enforcement of the covenant not to compete”); 
Knight, Vale & Gregory v. McDaniel, 680 P.2d 448, 452 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984) 
(finding that “public policy requires us to carefully examine covenants not to 
compete, even when protection of a legitimate business interest is demonstrated, 
because of equally competing concerns of freedom of employment and free access of 
the public to professional services”); Armstrong v. Taco Time Int’l, Inc., 635 P.2d 
1114, 1118 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that for the non-compete to be reasonable 
it should read “during the term of the franchise agreement” rather than the broader 
during the term of the franchise). 
 114 Another recent development has been a statute, which makes non-competes in 
the broadcast industry void if the broadcaster is terminated without just cause. See 
WASH. REV. CODE § 49.44.190 (2015). 
 115 Labriola v. Pollard Group, Inc., 100 P.3d 791, 792 (Wash. 2004). 
 116 Id. at 836-37; see also McKasson v. Johnson, 315 P.3d 1138, 1141 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2013) (“Valid incorporation of a non-compete clause requires the employer to 
give the employee consideration in exchange for the employee’s employment 
restriction; consideration in this context is an employer’s promise to do something for 
the employee or to give the employee an additional benefit in exchange for the 
employee’s agreement to the restriction.”). 
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restrictions against working with an employee’s former clients or 
customers.”117 However, “Washington courts have been more 
circumspect when considering restrictions that would prevent an 
employee from taking on any competitive employment. These general 
restrictions on competition are more suspect than mere bans on 
working with former clients or customers.”118 General restrictions will 
only be supported if the employer can show that their particular field 
of work necessitates such restrictions.119 Additionally, Washington 
courts have no problem limiting the duration or geographic scope of 
non-compete agreements, especially when the employer cannot 
demonstrate that such duration or scope is necessary.120 
Washington’s approach to enforcing non-competes is well within 
the mainstream when compared with other rule of reason 
jurisdictions. Scholars have developed rating systems to compare the 
law of non-competes of the different states. For example, Professor 
Norman Bishara rates each state’s enforceability strength on a scale of 
1 to 51, with 51 signaling the weakest enforcement. In Professor 
Bishara’s rating system California received a score of 50 and 
Washington 13. By comparison, Virginia scored 38, North Carolina 
35, Texas 32, Massachusetts 18, Michigan 15, and Illinois 4.121 In 
Professor Mark Garmaise’s “Noncompetition Enforceability Index,” 
rating states from 0 to 9, California received a score of 0 and 
Washington received a score of 5. Washington’s enforceability score 
ranked higher than North Carolina’s 4, Virginia’s 3, and Texas’ 3; the 
same as Illinois’ and Michigan’s 5; and lower than Massachusetts’ 6.122 
Legal scholars since Professor Gilson have evaluated the utility of 
non-competes by looking primarily at statutes and a handful of 
reported cases. That is a significant part of the story to be sure but 
when it comes to knowledge spillovers in high technology sectors, 
another part of the story is more important: how frequently employers 
actually enforce non-competes.123 If creative workers flow from firm to 
 
 117 Amazon, Inc. v. Powers, No. C12-1911RAJ, 2012 WL 6726538, at *8 (W.D. 
Wash. Dec. 27, 2012). 
 118 Id. at *9. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave, supra note 18, at 787; see also Evan Starr, Training 
the Enemy? Firm-Sponsored Training and the Enforcement of Covenants Not to Compete, 
5-8 (Jan. 25, 2015), http://www-personal.umich.edu/~starre/papers/JMP/Starr_JMP_ 
NoAppendix.pdf (suggesting modest improvements to Bishara’s model). 
 122 Garmaise, supra note 18, at 420. 
 123 See Bishara, Martin & Thomas, supra note 29, at 15 (“[V]ery little is understood 
about the actual deployment of [non-competes] and other postemployment 
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firm regularly even though an employer could, potentially, enforce a 
non-compete, then the economy in fact gains the vaunted advantages 
of knowledge spillovers. Using research from Washington State, I 
show that the enforcement of non-competes in the technology sector 
is very leaky. The use of non-competes may be ubiquitous, but 
enforcement of them is not. Rarely do high technology firms enforce 
non-competes against employees who depart either to join another 
firm or to start their own firm. The next Section presents that 
research. It also addresses why the potentially chilling in terrorem 
effect of non-competes does not significantly slow knowledge 
spillovers. Indeed, the in terrorem effect and the leakiness of non-
compete enforcement are related. If creative workers know that firms 
rarely enforce non-competes, then they will not be frozen in fear of 
changing firms or starting a new firm. 
C. Washington’s Leaky Non-Compete Legal Infrastructure 
1. Non-Compete Enforcement Is Very Leaky 
I wanted to discover how often Washington’s technology firms sue 
their departing employees to enforce a non-compete. To do that, I 
performed research to learn: (1) how many non-compete enforcement 
cases employers filed in Washington’s state and federal trial courts, 
and (2) how many of those cases were related to workers in 
technology fields.124 I found that between the years 2005 and 2014,125 
employers filed a total of 32 non-compete enforcement cases against 
 
restrictions on employee activities in modern business relationships.”); id. at 49 
(noting that previous papers “used the mere possibility of [non-compete] 
enforceability regardless of the likelihood of enforcement”). A study by Beck Reed 
Riden LLP studied only reported non-compete cases. See Russell Beck, Trade Secret 
and Noncompete Survey — National Case Graph 2015, FAIR COMPETITION LAW (Jan. 17, 
2015), http://faircompetitionlaw.com/2015/01/17/trade-secret-and-noncompete-survey-
national-case-graph-2015/. 
 124 Using Bloomberg Law’s Docket Search tool that tracks court filings for the cases 
in its database, we searched for all case filings in Washington’s state and federal courts 
that included the terms “noncompete,” “noncompetition,” “not to compete,” and 
“non-compete.” We then manually looked through the results, determining whether 
each case was actually related to a non-compete and whether it was in the field of 
technology. We also searched news databases to see if we could turn up additional 
cases dealing with non-competes. The searches were performed by my research 
assistant Peter Montine with assistance from the librarians at the Gallagher Law 
Library, University of Washington School of Law. 
 125 The Bloomberg Law Docket Search database begins with cases in 2005 so that 
was our starting point. 
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departing employees in Washington courts.126 Of those 32 cases, 11 
were brought by employers who produce technology-related products 
or services although at least 3 of those 11 cases involved departing 
salespeople rather than workers who invent or create127 and 1 focused 
on financial information rather than inventive or creative ideas.128 
During that same period of time, however, hundreds of creative 
workers changed technology firms in Washington.129 
The details of these cases reveal interesting facts about the leakiness 
of the non-compete enforcement landscape in Washington’s 
technology sector. Technology giants Microsoft and Amazon.com 
brought only one case each in the ten-year period, both in response to 
an employee departing to work for rival Google.130 Both of these cases 
settled within a year, allowing the departing employee to work at 
Google.131 The balance of the lawsuits came from small to medium 
sized firms in a wide variety of technology sub-sectors: restoration and 
 
 126 Appendix A contains a table showing the complete results of our research. 
 127 See, e.g., Gill v. DePuy Spine, Inc., No. 2-13-CV-00252-LRS (E.D. Wash. July 9, 
2013) (Bloomberg Law); Fluke Elecs. Corp. v. Cordex Instruments, No. C12:2082JLR, 
2013 WL 566949 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 13, 2013); CH20, Inc. v. Bernier, No. C11-
5153RJB, 2011 WL 1485604 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 18, 2011). 
 128 See Axtman v. KC Distance Learning, Inc., No. C10-1022JLR, *5 (W.D. Wash. 
Jan. 9, 2012) (Bloomberg Law). 
 129 See see also Brier Dudley, Cuts Come at Hopeful Time for Company, Job Seekers, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 19, 2014, at A8-A9 (describing the good prospects of workers 
laid off by Microsoft to work at Google, Amazon, and other technology firms); Coral 
Garnick, Ignition Partners Ready to Invest Again, SEATTLE TIMES, May 22, 2015, at A12, 
A14 (quoting the CEO of a venture capital firm: “You can’t find a company these days 
that doesn’t have former Microsoft and Amazon employees”); Vivian Giang, A New 
Report Ranks America’s Biggest Companies Based on How Quickly Employees Jump Ship, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (July 25, 2013, 8:14 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ 
companies-ranked-by-turnover-rates-2013-7. Cf. Gene Balk, The Californians Keep 
Coming, but King County Gives Back, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 30, 2015, 3:35 PM), 
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/data/the-californians-keep-coming-but-king-
county-gives-back/ (reporting on the back and forth flow of employees between 
California and tech hub King County: “Here’s a switch: Pretty soon, it might be 
Californians who get to complain about all the folks from Seattle who keep moving 
down there”). 
 130 See Microsoft Corp. v. Kai-Fu Lee, Google, Inc., and Amazon.com Inc. v. 
Powers infra Appendix A. Another case involves a non-compete between Microsoft 
and another software firm that does not involve a departing employee. See Veritas 
Operating Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. C06-0703-JCC, 2008 WL 687117 (W.D. 
Wash. Mar. 11, 2008) (adopting report and recommendation and granting plaintiff’s 
motion for summary judgment that defendant was not entitled to recover damages for 
claim infringement, and of non-infringement and invalidity). 
 131 See infra Appendix A. 
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environmental control products;132 health care payment and claims 
processing software;133 low cost computer parts;134 spinal treatment 
products;135 wireless electrocardiogram patches;136 electronics;137 
chemical products used in agriculture and water treatment;138 
litigation discovery software;139 and online education services.140 On 
average these cases settled in less than a year.141 Apart from the 
Microsoft and Amazon.com cases mentioned previously,142 none of the 
lawsuits garnered any news coverage to speak of. 
In sum, the volume of lawsuits brought to enforce non-competes 
against departing knowledge workers (about 1 per year) was 
miniscule. The suits were dispersed among many technology sub-
sectors, so that no sub-sector was disproportionately impacted by non-
compete litigation. Start-up technology ventures were not targeted 
disproportionately (as some have feared).143 Cases concluded quickly 
 
 132 See, e.g., Dri-Eaz Prods., Inc. v. Nguyen, No. C11-1654Z, 2012 WL 1537598 
(W.D. Wash. May 1, 2012) (litigating company was a restoration products company). 
 133 See, e.g., Edifecs Inc. v. Singh, No. 2:10-CV-0067-RSL (W.D. Wash. Jan. 11, 
2010) (Bloomberg Law) (litigating company provides software solutions). 
 134 See, e.g., Compuvest Corp. v. Dolinsky, No. C07-1524RAJ, 2009 WL 1604525 
 (W.D. Wash. June 5, 2009) (litigating company sold computer parts). 
 135 See, e.g., Gill v. DePuy Spine, Inc., No. 2:13-CV-00252-LRS (E.D. Wash. July 9, 
2014) (Bloomberg Law) (defending company sells spinal products). 
 136 See, e.g., Bardy v. Cardiac Sci. Corp., No. C13-0778JLR, 2014 WL 294526 
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 27, 2014) (litigating company manufactures medical devices). 
 137 See, e.g., Fluke Elecs. Corp. v. Cordex Instruments, No. C12-2082JLR, 2013 WL 
566949 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 13, 2013) (litigating company manufactures electronic 
devices). 
 138 See, e.g., CH20, Inc. v. Bernier, No. C11-5153RJB, 2011 WL 1485604 (W.D. 
Wash. Apr. 18, 2011) (litigating company manufactures chemical products). 
 139 See, e.g., Elec. Evidence Discovery Inc. v. Chepalis, No. C07-1929RSL, 2007 WL 
4376194 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 13, 2007) (litigating company manufactures software 
products). 
 140 See, e.g., Axtman v. KC Distance Learning, Inc., No. C10-1022JLR (W.D. Wash. 
Jan. 9, 2012) (Bloomberg Law) (litigating company provides educational software). 
 141 Non-compete cases in Washington involving technology firms settled in 11.8 
months on average, compared to an average settlement time of 13.7 months for all 
non-compete cases in Washington. See infra Appendix A. 
 142 See, e.g., Press Release, Microsoft Corp., Statement from Microsoft Regarding 
Legal Action Against Google and Former Executive (July 19, 2005), available at 
https://news.microsoft.com/2005/07/19/statement-from-microsoft-regarding-legal-
action-against-google-and-a-former-executive/ (Microsoft’s press release explaining its 
position in the Kai-Fu Lee litigation); Juan Carlos Perez, Microsoft, Google Spar in Kai-
Fu Lee Case, INFOWORLD (Sept. 6, 2005), http://www.infoworld.com/article/2671497/ 
operating-systems/microsoft—google-spar-in-kai-fu-lee-case.html (reporting on the 
litigation between Microsoft and Google over Kai-Fu Lee’s departure from Microsoft ). 
 143 See Simon & Loten, supra note 25. See generally Evan Starr, Natarajan 
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with little or no publicity. This evidence suggests that non-compete 
lawsuits did not significantly block technology-related knowledge 
spillovers in Washington. 
2. Pragmatic Reasons For Leaky Enforcement 
The evidence of pervasive leakiness of non-competes in Washington 
should not come as a surprise. Employers are simply making smart 
business decisions to ignore non-competes; that is, they are engaging 
in economically rational selective enforcement.144 Firms need a good 
reason to bring a lawsuit, a reason that justifies the cost and hassle of 
litigation and the negative vibe that reverberates when a technology 
firm gets too aggressive. Pervasive leakiness is perfectly rational, and 
there is a long list of reasons why it makes sense for employers to 
enforce non-competes only infrequently.145 
Reason Number 1 — Litigation Cost. Small firms do not have the 
resources to pay lawyers to bring suit very often or to prolong 
litigation for too long. Large firms may146 have more financial 
resources for litigation but they also have more departing employees 
to track and worry about. On top of attorneys’ fees and court costs, 
litigation taxes the employer in other ways as well. An employer-
plaintiff’s employees (often senior executives and key technical 
 
Balasubramanian & Mariko Sakakibara, Enforcing Covenants Not to Compete: The Life-Cycle 
Impact on New Firms 3, U.S. Census Bureau Center for Economic Studies Paper No. CES-
WP- 14-27 (Jun 15, 2014), available at https://faircompetitionlaw.files.wordpress.com/ 
2015/02/more-noncompete-enforcement-equals-fewer-but-better-startups-starr_nv.pdf 
(evaluating the pros and cons of non-compete enforcement on new firms, including entry 
rate, size, growth, and survival). 
 144 See, e.g., STEVEN LEVY, IN THE PLEX: HOW GOOGLE THINKS, WORKS, AND SHAPES 
OUR LIVES 282-83 (2011) (reporting that, roughly a year before the Kai-Fu Lee case, 
Microsoft deeply lamented its loss of key technical executive Mark Lucovsky to 
Google but apparently took no legal action); DAVID A. VISE, THE GOOGLE STORY 259-60 
(2008) (reporting that Google had hired many Microsoft employees before Microsoft 
eventually sued Kai-Fu Lee). 
 145 This list reflects insights gained from my 15-plus years of law practice 
representing employees and employers of all sizes in the technology industry. See 
Blake, supra note 3, at 691 (noting that employer’s now understand that non-competes 
“are not always costless”). See generally David Barnhizer, Abandoning an “Unethical” 
System of Legal Ethics, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 347, 391-412 (describing factors 
involved in performing case evaluation); William Lynch Schaller, Secrets of the Trade: 
Tactical and Legal Considerations from the Trade Secret Plaintiff’s Perspective, 29 REV. 
LITIG. 729 (2010) (generally describing the considerations in bringing trade secret 
litigation). 
 146 I say “may” have more resources because it seems unlikely that an unprofitable 
large company will choose to spend its precious resources on low utility non-compete 
litigation. 
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workers) need to spend many hours working with litigation counsel 
on strategy, discovery, pleadings, affidavits and evidence development, 
motions, and protective orders. This takes time and focus away from 
core business and creative activities147 and most (if not all) creative 
workers have little patience for it. Litigation is an expensive and 
disruptive proposition even for a plaintiff, a reality that larger 
companies know as well or better than smaller ones. 
Reason Number 2 — Counter-Litigation Risk. Once the employer 
brings suit, the employee can counterclaim. An employee might 
counterclaim for unpaid overtime pay or other compensation, breach 
of contract, or raise an unfair competition claim. These counterclaims 
often pose risks for the employer that exceeds the expense and 
potential gains of enforcing a non-compete. These counterclaims 
persist even if the employer loses the non-compete case. If a trial court 
dismisses a non-compete case or refuses to grant pre-trial injunctive 
relief, then the employer probably wants to terminate the litigation 
but, instead, gets stuck defending a case that it provoked by its own 
aggressive actions. Even when counterclaims do not seem dangerous 
to the employer in a given case, there is a danger that an aggressive 
litigation posture will draw unwanted attention from government 
agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission, Department of 
Justice, and the State Attorney General. 
Reason Number 3 — Trade Secret Disclosure Risk. Many non-
compete lawsuits also involve trade secrets. After the employer files 
suit, the employer must disclose during discovery the particular trade 
secret information that the employer claims the employee has or might 
risk misappropriating.148 The employer must disclose this information 
not only to the court but also to the employee’s litigation counsel and, 
in many cases, the in-house counsel and certain employees of the 
competitor who hired the employee (such as Google in the Microsoft v. 
Kai-Fu Lee case). A protective order lessens the risk of improper trade 
secret disclosure in the course of litigation149 but many technology 
 
 147 The Wright brothers’ obsession with litigation at the expense of innovation is a 
good and well known cautionary tale. See LAWRENCE GOLDSTONE, BIRDMEN: THE 
WRIGHT BROTHERS, GLENN CURTISS, AND THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE SKIES 293-315 
(2014). 
 148 See generally Dale Kotchka-Alanes, Trade Secret Misappropriation: Tell Me Your 
Secret Before I Tell You Whether I Have It, NAT. L. REV. (Nov. 25, 2014), http:// 
www.natlawreview.com/article/trade-secret-misappropriation-tell-me-your-secret-i-tell-
you-whether-i-have-it (“[A] number of courts have held that plaintiffs must sufficiently 
identify their trade secrets before discovery concerning those trade secrets can 
commence.”). 
 149 See, e.g., UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 5 (amended 1985) (describing secrecy 
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firms calculate that the potential danger of disclosure during litigation 
is greater than the potential benefit of winning a non-compete case. In 
addition, trial courts in Washington have shown a propensity to scale 
back the veil of secrecy sought by the litigants in trade secret cases in 
response to concerns raised about the transparency and openness of 
public judicial proceedings.150 
Reason Number 4 — Proof Problems and Uncertain Outcomes. 
Employers can enforce a non-compete in Washington courts but they 
know that it is not easy. Washington’s rule of reason was developed by 
the courts to discourage regular non-compete litigation and it works 
just that way in practice.151 Recall that in Washington the employer 
must prove that (1) the restraint is necessary for the protection of the 
business or good will of the employer, (2) the restraint does not 
impose on the employee any greater restraint than is reasonably 
necessary to secure the business or goodwill of the employer, and (3) 
the degree of injury to the public caused by loss of the service and skill 
of the employee is not too great.152 After using this test to evaluate the 
reasonableness of the non-compete, the court enforces the non-
compete only so far as is reasonable which includes the often difficult 
task of proving that the departing employee is doing “competitive” 
work.153 Employers know that Washington courts often carve back the 
scope of a non-compete.154 This creates uncertainty for the employer 
 
in judicial proceedings, including protective orders). 
 150 See Dreiling v. Jain, 93 P.3d 861, 870-71 (Wash. 2004); Seattle Times Co. v. 
Ishikawa, 640 P.2d 716, 724 (Wash. 1982). 
 151 Some scholars see this as a nation-wide trend: “The emerging law of employee 
noncompete agreements significantly restricts the power of employers to impose 
postemployment restrictions on competition. . . . These opinions [in recent cases] 
have made it more difficult for employers to draft and enforce covenants not to 
compete in the employment setting.” Garrison & Wendt, supra note 17, at 148. See 
Systems & Software, Inc. v. Barnes, 886 A.2d 762, 764 (Vt. 2005) (“We have stated 
that ‘we will proceed with caution’ when asked to enforce covenants against 
competitive employment because such restraints run counter to public policy favoring 
the right of individuals to engage in the commercial activity of their choice.”). 
 152 See Amazon, Inc. v. Powers, No. C12-1911RAJ, 2012 WL 6726538, at *8 (W.D. 
Wash. Dec. 27, 2012) (applying the test from Perry v. Moran). The burden of proof is 
on the employer. See BRIAN M. MALSBERGER, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE: A STATE-BY-
STATE SURVEY 4628 (7th ed. Supp. 2011); see also Pac. Aerospace & Elecs., Inc. v. 
Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1198 (E.D. Wash. 2003) (discussing burden of proof for 
injunctive relief in non-compete case). See generally Riverview Floral, Ltd. v. Watkins, 
754 P.2d 1055 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (for preliminary injunction, employer must 
establish that an enforceable non-compete exists and has been or is about to be 
breached). 
 153 Amazon, Inc., 2012 WL 6726538, at *1.  
 154 See, e.g., id. at *8 (“If a court finds a restraint unreasonable, it can modify the 
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who is trying to assess whether litigation to enforce a non-compete 
will be worth it or not. In the face of this uncertainty, employers 
normally bring cases where the risk of failing to enforce a non-
compete is particularly high, often because the risk of trade secret 
disclosure is particularly acute. If the departing employee goes to work 
for a competitor doing work that is not directly competitive or not 
particularly core to the employer, then it will not be worth the 
employer’s while to sue.155 
Reason Number 5 — Public Relations Risk. The public relations risk 
of non-compete litigation for technology employers is no small matter. 
They want to hire the best and brightest out of college, away from 
other firms,156 or have the opportunity to acquire an entire start-up 
enterprise primarily for the talented workers.157 Technology employers 
want to present their firm as an attractive place for creative workers to 
come. Non-compete litigation presents a negative vibe that can turn 
off and turn away creative workers. It might be more descriptive and 
precise to call this risk a “yuck” or “jerk” concern than a typical public 
relations issue because it’s not just a simple matter of looking bad to 
customers and the public at large. 
Reason Number 6 — Boomerang Effect. Creative workers change 
jobs a lot in the information economy.158 The nature of creative work 
and the culture of creative workers facilitate this movement.159 A 
 
agreement by enforcing it only ‘to the extent reasonably possible to accomplish the 
contract’s purpose.’”); Wood v. May, 438 P.2d 587, 590 (Wash. 1968) (ruling that 
courts should “modify [restrictions] on the basis of [their] factual findings” and not 
feel “obligated to either accept or reject restrictions In toto”). 
 155 Many scholars have expressed concern that a trial court’s blue pencil power 
provides an incentive for employers to write overly broad non-competes with the 
associated in chilling effect on employees who fear enforcement. Those concerns are 
important, to be sure, but scholars have failed to note how the uncertainty of outcome 
that the blue pencil power creates for employers can discourage an employer from 
enforcing a non-compete. 
 156 See RANDALL E. STROSS, THE MICROSOFT WAY: THE REAL STORY OF HOW THE 
COMPANY OUTSMARTS ITS COMPETITION 32-45 (1996) (reporting how attracting 
excellent programmers makes it easier to attract other programmers of the same 
caliber). 
 157 See John F. Coyle & Gregg D. Polsky, Acqui-Hiring, 63 DUKE L.J. 281, 293-94 
(2013); Andres Sawicki, Buying Teams, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 651, 654 (2015). 
 158 See Giang, supra note 129.  
 159 Several scholars have noted that the work environment for creative workers in 
the information economy is characterized by mobility and flexibility. See, e.g., PETER 
CAPELLI, THE NEW DEAL AT WORK: MANAGING THE MARKET-DRIVEN WORKPLACE 18 
(1999) (characterizing today’s typical employment relationship as “an open-ended 
negotiation based on market power”); Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for 
Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in 
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software developer, for example, may start her career at one firm, leave 
to work as an independent contractor for a time, then join a start- up 
venture, and ultimately return to her first employer. Technology firms 
know about and expect this boomerang effect.160 An aggressive 
approach by an employer to enforcing a non-compete creates a “yuck” 
factor that may discourage a valuable worker from returning. This 
makes employers careful not to enforce non-competes unless the 
circumstances are particularly compelling.161 
Reason Number 7 — Talent Quality and Fit Factors. A technology firm 
may not be sad to see a particular creative worker depart. Some workers 
do not meet the high expectations of their demanding employer or may 
be a poor cultural fit for various reasons.162 Many technology firms want 
to retain only the most inventive and creative workers who jive with the 
firm’s mission and work style.163 These highly competitive technology 
firms may be pleased if a mediocre or underperforming or misfit 
employee departs to work for a rival (unless, of course, the employee 
poses a serious risk of trade secret disclosure). 
 
Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 1163, 1167 (2001) [hereinafter 
Bargaining for Loyalty] (suggesting that employers will turn to non-competes to 
enforce prior “notions of obligation and commitment” in increasingly short-term 
modern employment relationships that are contrary to “traditional notions of 
employee loyalty”); Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes over the 
Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721, 722 
(2002) (discussing a management consultant’s strategy to “attract and retain valued 
employees . . . [by] permit[ting] people to customize their jobs to suit their own 
ambitions and lifestyles”). 
 160 Perhaps Steve Jobs and Apple are the most famous boomerang story in the 
technology industry. See WALTER ISAACSON, STEVE JOBS 305-26 (2011). Another 
interesting story is the near-boomerang of former Microsoft senior vice-president Paul 
Maritz who became CEO of Microsoft competitor VMWare and then was on the short 
list to replace Steve Ballmer as CEO of Microsoft. These senior executive boomerangs 
make headlines but boomerangs are quite ordinary among rank and file creative 
workers. 
 161 See Coyle & Polsky, supra note 157, at 302-10. 
 162 Google is a good case in point. See KEN AULETTA, GOOGLED: THE END OF THE 
WORLD AS WE KNOW IT 46-65 (2009); LEVY, supra note 144, at 121-66; VISE, supra 
note 144, at 240-83. Amazon.com is also a good case in point. See Jodi Kantor & 
David Streitfeld, Inside Amazon: Wrestling Big Ideas in a Bruising Workplace, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/technology/inside-amazon-
wrestling-big-ideas-in-a-bruising-workplace.html?_r=0 (describing employee turnover 
due to ill fit in an intense work environment). 
 163 A clever disgruntled employee who wishes to leave an unsatisfactory situation 
can foster his or her employer’s indifference by performing solid but unspectacular 
work or by working a bit slower than the employer’s hectic pace requires for a top 
performance review. 
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Reason Number 8 — MAD Effect. It is striking that our research did 
not uncover many lawsuits between large well-resourced technology 
firms in Washington. Microsoft and Amazon.com make their home in 
Washington, of course, but Google, Facebook, Adobe, and Apple 
(among others) also have significant presences in Washington, all for 
the express purpose of capitalizing on Washington’s excellent market 
for creative workers.164 Employees move regularly between these fierce 
competitors165 in significant numbers yet the volume of non-compete 
litigation is tiny. One explanation is that these firms know how to 
place departing employees in productive but safe (from a non-compete 
standpoint) positions. In addition, these firms likely fear a steady 
barrage of non-compete lawsuits in which they take turns playing the 
role of plaintiff and defendant. This state of “mutually assured 
destruction (‘MAD’)” (to borrow the cold war nomenclature), keeps 
non-compete litigation to a low level.166 
Reason Number 9 — Win-Win Effect. One of the most significant 
and overlooked reasons that technology firms do not enforce non-
competes is that the employee’s departure represents a “win-win.” 
That may be true, as explained above, in the context of the Talent 
Quality and Fit Factor. But often a valued creative worker departs to 
work for a firm or to start a firm that produces complementary 
technology or services, or that makes productive use of technology or 
ideas that an employer has shelved or discarded. 167 These workers 
leave with (or later receive) the blessing of the former employer; 
sometimes they also leave with a technology license and perhaps seed 
funding because they play a critical role in the ecosystem for the 
employer’s technology by contributing to its overall value proposition 
for customers and to positive network effects.168 
 
 164 See generally Dudley, Apple Joins the Party, supra note 101 (discussing Apple’s 
presence in Washington). 
 165 See Ananya Bhattacharya, Want to Get a Job at Google or Amazon? Work at 
Microsoft First, INC.COM (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.inc.com/ananya-bhattacharya/ 
where-tech-firms-look-for-workers.html. 
 166 Another possible reason for low litigation numbers in Washington may be the 
kind of secret non-poaching agreement that led to litigation in California. 
 167 See, e.g., Brier Dudley, Microsoft Backs Ex-Workers in Taking Its Lync Worldwide, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 26, 2015, at A6, A7 (describing Microsoft’s support of a venture by 
ex-Microsoft employees). In addition, former Microsoft creative worker Gabe Newell 
founded Valve, which makes highly successful games for the Xbox console, Stephen 
Purpura founded “big data” analysis company Context Relevant, and Gilad Odinak 
founded Spoken Communications which develops cloud-based call center software. 
 168 See Shira Ovide, Microsoft’s Satya Nadella Makes Peace With Silicon Valley, WALL 
ST. J. (Feb. 4, 2015, 12:57 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/microsofts-satya-nadella-
makes-peace-with-silicon-valley-1423072674 (describing the importance of building 
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In sum, from the employer’s point of view, an employee’s departure 
normally triggers indifference, enthusiasm or relief, so there is no 
sensible reason to sue its departing employees over a non-compete. 
Even when a particular departure triggers concern, employers must 
weigh the extent of the concern, picking those battles that truly justify 
the litigation costs of all kinds that I described above. Even when trade 
secrets are involved, the departing employee may have taken an idea 
that was too insignificant to justify litigation. Contrary to popular 
belief, non-compete litigation is anything but a “no brainer.” 
3. Plugging Significant Trade Secrets Leaks 
The prior section discussed the reasons why employers do not 
pursue non-compete litigation but one reason stands out for bringing 
suit: the risk of significant trade secret loss.169 The employer can bring 
a standalone trade secret case, of course, but adding a cause of action 
for breach of a non-compete augments the trade secret claim.170 In a 
trade secret case, the employer must prove that the employee 
misappropriated trade secret information.171 This presents two 
challenges: first, the employer must separate its trade secrets from the 
employee’s general skill and knowledge;172 and second, the employer 
must prove that the employee took trade secrets through improper 
means.173 These items are often more difficult to prove174 than that the 
 
an ecosystem through partnering with other technology firms). 
 169 One scholar reports that over two-thirds of all trade secret cases involve 
departing employees. See David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret 
Litigation in State Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 59-60 (2011); see, e.g., Pacific 
Aerospace & Elecs., Inc. v. Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1203 (E.D. Wash. 2003) 
(determining the scope of the injunction to protect trade secrets while still allowing 
defendant to pursue work through fair competition). 
 170 See Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty, supra note 159, at 1204-05; 
Cynthia Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete 
Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 416 (2006); 
Stone, supra note 159, at 747.  
 171 See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 (amended 1985); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (1995); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939). 
 172 See SI Handling Sys. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1266-69 (3d Cir. 1985). See 
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396(b) (1958) (describing an 
employee’s right to use his or her skills and general knowledge). 
 173 Economic Analysis of Labor and Employment Law in the New Economy: 
Proceedings of 2008 Annual Meeting, Association of American Law Schools, Section on 
Law and Economics, 12 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 327, 340 n.43 (2008). 
 174 See, e.g., Loftness Specialized Farm Equip. Inc. v. Twiestmeyer, 742 F.3d 845, 
850-51 (8th Cir. 2014) (discussing burden of proof). 
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employee went to work for a competitor on competitive technology.175 
Indeed, one of the most sympathetic sorts of non-compete cases, and 
thus one of the easiest to win, is a case in which the employer faces a 
serious threat of trade secret loss to the employer’s direct competitor 
via the inevitable disclosure of trade secret information by a departing 
employee.176 If a non-compete case can help plug a dangerous trade 
secret leak, then an employer may well decide that it makes good 
sense to pursue it.177 
4. Assessing Potential Chilling Effects: More Freedom Than Fear 
The lawsuits themselves are only part of the story, of course. We 
worry that the threat of litigation, reinforced by the knowledge that 
employers do in fact bring lawsuits against departing employees, keeps 
creative workers on the sidelines.178 To what extent does this potential 
chilling effect prevent knowledge spillovers in Washington? To ask 
the question in a different way in light of the research presented 
above: are a few, widely dispersed, quickly concluded, rarely 
publicized lawsuits deterring hundreds of creative workers from 
changing firms or starting new firms in Washington? Or, perhaps, are 
the workers getting a different message from the leakiness — a 
message of freedom rather than of fear? I turn now to these questions. 
Scholars have often voiced concerns about the chilling effects of 
non-compete litigation, the so-called in terrorem effect.179 This concern 
 
 175 See Comprehensive Tech. Int’l Inc. v. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d 730, 739 
(4th Cir. 1993) vacated on petition for reh’g (1993) (“It will often be difficult, if not 
impossible, to prove that a competing employee has misappropriated trade secret 
information belonging to his former employer.”). 
 176 See, e.g., Reed, Roberts Assocs. v. Strauman, 353 N.E.2d 590, 593-94 (N.Y. 
1976) (holding that non-competes are unenforceable if the former employer’s 
customer list was not stolen, the employee’s knowledge does not qualify as trade 
secret, and employee’s services are not unique or extraordinary). 
 177 See, e.g., Newell Rubbermaid, Inc. v. Storm, No. 9398-VCN, 2014 WL 1266827, 
at *10-11 (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2014) (granting temporary restraining order where it is 
likely that plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm without interim injunctive relief). 
 178 See Richard P. Rita Pers. Servs. Int’l, Inc. v. Kot, 191 S.E.2d 79, 81 (Ga. 1972); 
Reddy v. Cmty. Health Found. of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906, 916-17 (W. Va. 1982); see also 
Simon & Loten, supra note 25 (stating that more than 60% of former employees get 
sued by their former employers). 
 179 See, e.g., Blake, supra note 3, at 683 (acknowledging the possibility of in 
terrorem effects of non-competes but arguing that courts need discretion through a 
general approach to “tailor the covenant to provide such protection with a minimum 
burden to the employee” where the restraints on the employee are generally fair and 
designed to protect the employer’s legitimate interests); Phillip J. Closius & Henry M. 
Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude: The Current Judicial Enforcement of Employee 
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makes good sense. Everyone can imagine a departing employee 
complying with a non-compete simply out of fear of being sued. We 
picture a risk adverse worker, perhaps lacking legal sophistication, 
without the financial means to withstand a non-compete lawsuit. We 
see in our minds a worker frozen in his or her current position or 
forced out of the work force through fear of litigation. We also 
imagine an employer with the knowledge, will, incentive, and financial 
means to pursue non-compete litigation. We picture a real and present 
danger. But, unfortunately, this stylized story deceives us. By and 
large, both employees180 and employers181 in the technology sector 
approach non-competes in a more nuanced, sophisticated way than 
this simple sketch suggests. The closer we look and the more we learn, 
the more we see that the in terrorem effect is less than meets the eye. 
Let’s return to the setting described in the prior section.182 Every 
day, hundreds of creative workers in Washington who have signed 
non-competes change firms or start new firms. Rarely does a 
technology firm sue a departing employee to enforce the non-compete. 
Even when a firm brings suit, the potential chilling effect is dispersed 
among various technology sub-sectors and not widely publicized. 
Sometimes the litigation impact is muted because the departing 
employee’s new firm (e.g., Google in the Microsoft v. Kai-Fu Lee case) 
or a venture capitalist (for a hot start-up) funds the employee’s legal 
expenses and provides savvy advice on how to navigate around, 
defend or settle a non-compete suit. Typically the lawsuit ends quickly 
with the worker joining the new firm within a short period of time. 
In other words, there is no data suggesting that Washington’s 
creative workers should fear non-compete lawsuits and, as the saying 
goes, “No data is data.” Except when the threat of trade secret loss is 
particularly acute, technology employers signal through leaky 
enforcement of non-competes that creative workers can move freely. 
The abiding lesson that most creative workers take from the pattern of 
systematic non-compete non-enforcement in Washington State is that 
 
Covenants Not to Compete — A Proposal for Reform, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 531, 532 (1984) 
(“Regardless of their validity and enforceability, covenants not to compete chill the 
free movement of employees and eliminate competition among actual and potential 
employers.”); Moffat, The Wrong Tool, supra note 10, at 888-90 (discussing the in 
terrorem effects of employer overreach in non-competes). 
 180 Professor Harlan’s seminal article from the early 1960’s indicates that even in 
that era highly trained technical, engineering, and research personnel were often 
sophisticated enough to negotiate non-competes. See Blake, supra note 3, at 627. 
 181 Id. at 687-89 (outlining a nuanced approach to non-competes that should be 
undertaken by employers). 
 182 See supra Part III.C.1. 
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they have little to fear from non-competes. Departing employees 
experience more freedom than fear. Thus, Washington’s creative 
workers are simply (and quite rationally) engaged in the efficient 
breach of non-competes on a large scale. 
The worker’s feeling of safety from non-compete litigation is 
enhanced because an employer seldom knows where the departing 
employee is working next. If the departing employee is starting a new 
venture, it often takes a significant amount of time to incubate a 
technology start-up — to develop the firm’s technology, raise capital, 
and write the business plan. By that time, the non-compete has expired 
or lost its potency because it has nearly expired.183 This natural stealth 
effect means that, from a practical standpoint, technology employers 
only enforce non-competes when they discover a particular dangerous 
or egregious situation presented by a departing employee. 
In addition, creative workers are clever enough to find productive 
but not directly competitive work in their next position. For example, 
a software programmer that worked on operating system memory 
management code might take a position working on file system or 
directory software. In the information economy the types of inventive 
and creative works that need to be produced are so plentiful and so 
diverse that there is little concern that a worker will find himself or 
herself without something productive to do. In other words, if an 
employee leaves Microsoft, he or she will have little difficulty finding 
interesting and productive but not dangerously competitive work at 
Amazon.com, Apple, Facebook, or Google. Indeed, creative workers 
are accustomed to applying their knowledge and talent in different 
contexts because many technology firms think it is a best practice to 
rotate their creative workers through many different types of 
assignments so that they can apply new insights and perspectives that 
they bring from prior assignments.184 
 
 183 The more time that passes after the employee’s departure, the less inclined a court 
might be to grant an emergency temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction 
because the danger does not seem particularly imminent or acute. See EarthWeb, Inc. v. 
Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Bishara, Martin & Thomas, supra 
note 29, at 36 (reporting that most non-compete lengths were 1–2 years). 
 184 See Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1333, 1334 
(2015) (drawing on work from cognitive psychology, management studies, and art 
history to show the overlooked creative upside of constraints); Stine Grodal & Grid 
Thoma, Cross-Pollination in Science and Technology: Concept Mobility in the 
Nanobiotechnology Field, ANNALES D’ECONOMIE ET DE STATISTIQUE, 3-4 (2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1394375 (discussing cross-pollination of knowledge among 
different institutional environments); Charles Coy, Why Rotating Employees Through 
Your Company Is a Win-Win, CORNERSTONE BLOG (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www. 
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In this environment, creative workers have little to fear from non-
competes and they know it.185 They are sophisticated enough to realize 
that even if they get sued, someone may pick up their legal expenses, 
the suit will end quickly, and in the end they can work for the new 
firm with relatively minor wrinkles.186 At worst, a lawsuit provides an 
opportunity for the employer and departing employee to “right size” 
the scope of the non-compete to fit the specific circumstances that 
have arisen. However, it’s not a perfectly rational world, of course, so 
sometimes technology firms sue creative workers over non-competes 
when sound reason should dictate otherwise and when it is unfair to 
drag the employee into litigation. These types of lawsuits contribute 
strongly to the danger of an in terrorem effect, so Part IV offers some 
proposals to reduce this concern. 
5. The Comparative Advantage of the Washington Way 
Washington’s leaky legal infrastructure for non-competes enables 
capacious knowledge spillovers just as California’s ban on non-
competes does. This may come as a surprise to scholars who cite 
Professor Gilson’s article for the proposition that California’s approach 
is uniquely situated to foster innovation. It will not come as a surprise, 
however, to those who noticed Gilson’s ultimate conclusion that a rule 
of reason approach could support innovation equally well.187 Indeed, 
Washington’s way of approaching non-compete enforcement possesses 
one important advantage over California’s approach: in Washington, 
technology firms (large and small)188 can use non-competes to help 
plug significant trade secret leaks. 
 
cornerstoneondemand.com/blog/employee-rotation-works#.VV5aqZO2oYt. 
 185 But see Marx, supra note 29, at 695 (“In-depth interviews with 52 randomly 
sampled patent holders in a single industry, coupled with a survey of 1,029 engineers 
across a variety of industries” suggest that “ex-employees subject to non-competes are 
more likely to . . . involuntarily leave their technical field to avoid a potential 
lawsuit.”); Marx, Strumsky & Fleming, supra note 86, at 875 (arguing that 
“enforcement of noncompetes attenuates mobility” and that noncompete enforcement 
decreases mobility most sharply for inventors with “firm-specific skills and for those 
who specialize in narrow technical fields”). 
 186 See LEVY, supra note 144, at 281-83 (reporting how Kai-Fu Lee contacted 
Google while still employed as a Vice President at Microsoft and describing the non-
compete lawsuit brought by Microsoft against Mr. Lee and Google which ended in a 
settlement allowing Mr. Lee to work at Google). 
 187 Professor Gilson’s article counseled against adopting the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine, which he believed would impede knowledge spillovers in states using the 
rule of reason approach. See Gilson, supra note 8, at 622-27. 
 188 Scholars note that trade secret protection is particularly important to small 
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On its face, California’s ban on non-competes seems so clear and so 
absolute that use of a non-compete to protect a trade secret is out of the 
question.189 As the California Supreme Court put it in Edwards v. Arthur 
Andersen: “Under the statute’s plain meaning . . . an employer cannot by 
contract restrain a former employee from engaging in his or her 
profession, trade, or business unless the agreement falls within one of 
the exceptions to the rule.”190 Nonetheless, some courts have suggested 
that California law contains a trade secret exception to California’s ban 
on non-competes but the California Supreme Court in Edwards declined 
to address whether such an exception exists.191 Part IV explains why 
California courts should adopt the trade secret exception. 
IV. PROPOSALS FLOWING FROM THE WASHINGTON CASE STUDY 
A. California Should Recognize Its “Trade Secret Exception” 
Section 16600 voids any contract “by which anyone is restrained 
from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business.” The 
California Supreme Court in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen ruled that it 
will not allow judicially created exceptions to Section 16600. That 
ruling, however, does not mean that California’s ban on non-competes 
is incompatible with the protection of trade secrets provided by 
California’s version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”).192 
Trade secret protection is particularly important for California’s start-
up businesses and established firms such as Google that rely on trade 
secret protection more than patents.193 
 
firms that drive innovation in developing fields. See Josh Lerner, The Importance of 
Trade Secrecy: Evidence from Civil Litigation (Harv. Bus. School, Working Paper No. 
95-043, 1999). 
 189 Interestingly, a recent study of large company CEO employment contracts 
involving sophisticated parties represented by legal counsel showed that over 60% of 
sample employment contracts of firms headquartered in California contained a non-
compete. Bishara, Martin & Thomas, supra note 29, at 34. 
 190 Edwards v. Arthur Andersen, 189 P.3d 285, 289 (Cal. 2008). 
 191 See id. at 291 n.4. The possible trade secret exception can be traced to language 
in Gordon v. Landau, 321 P.2d 456, 457-58 (Cal. 1958), and Muggill v. Reuben H. 
Donnelley Corp., 398 P.2d 239, 242-43 (Cal. 1965). See also Fowler v. Varian Assocs., 
Inc., 241 Cal. Rptr. 539, 545 (Ct. App. 1987) (noting that agreements designed to 
protect proprietary information do not violate section 16600). 
 192 CAL. CIV. CODE tit. 5 § 3426 (2015); see Todd M. Malynn, Edwards v. Arthur 
Andersen LLP: The End of Judicially Created Restraints on Competition, 18 J. ANTI. & 
UNFAIR COMP. L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 35, 36-37 (2009) (discussing California’s Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act). 
 193 See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
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The UTSA provides a collection of remedies that courts can award 
for trade secret misappropriation, including emergency pre-trial 
injunctive relief, which is typically the most important remedy in trade 
secret litigation.194 The UTSA permits a court to enjoin both actual 
and “threatened” misappropriation.195 This raises the distinct 
possibility that a court could order a departing employee to avoid 
certain work assignments due to the imminent threat of improper use 
or disclosure of trade secrets. The focus of the court’s action in this 
case is not the enforcement of a contact restraining an employee from 
engaging in his or her “profession, trade, or business.” Rather, the 
focus is on fashioning the most (and often the only) meaningful 
remedy under the UTSA. An employee’s Non-disclosure Agreement 
(“NDA”) may be part of the equation to be sure196 but the court is not 
primarily concerned with enforcing a contract; the court is concerned 
with remedying the threat of trade secret misappropriation, separate 
and apart from and over and above, the contract. 
When viewed in this light, perhaps it is unhelpful to say that Section 
16600 needs a “trade secret exception.”197 Section 16600 is concerned 
with voiding private contracts that restrain an employee’s freedom to 
work; the UTSA is concerned with preventing actual and threatened trade 
secret misappropriation using all the remedies specified in the statute.198 
 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 35 (5th ed. 2012). 
 194 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2 (1985). 
 195 Id. § 2(a). 
 196 The UTSA requires that trade secret holders use reasonable measures to protect 
their trade secrets. Id. § 1(4)(ii). A Non-disclosure Agreement (“NDA”) is an industry 
standard trade secret protection measure which uses contract law to help guard 
against the improper use or disclosure of trade secrets. See GOMULKIEWICZ ET AL., 
LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW & APPLICATION 298-99 (3d ed. 2014). The 
UTSA prohibits the misappropriation of trade secrets in the absence of a NDA, of 
course, but a NDA serves useful signaling and notice functions.  
 197 It is also unhelpful to think of this in terms of the so-called “evitable disclosure 
doctrine” which Professor Gilson frowned on and has been rejected by a California 
court of appeals. See Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 293-94 (Ct. 
App. 2002). Indeed, some commentators note that the “inevitable disclosure doctrine” 
is mislabeled as a “doctrine” and that it is better understood simply as an equitable 
tool. See Brandy L. Treadway, An Overview of Individual States’ Application of Inevitable 
Disclosure: Concrete Doctrine or Equitable Tool?, 55 SMU L. REV. 621, 649 (2002). 
 198 See David Lincicum, Note, Inevitable Conflict?: California’s Policy of Worker 
Mobility and the Doctrine of “Inevitable Disclosure,” 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1257, 1274-80 
(2002) (concluding that there is no conflict between the UTSA and section 16600 so 
long as disclosure of a trade secret is truly inevitable and it would be impossible for 
the employee to perform in the new job without violating the duty of confidentiality 
to the previous employer); see also Jennifer L. Saulino, Note, Locating Inevitable 
Disclosure’s Place in Trade Secret Analysis, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1184, 1190-91 (2002). 
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Indeed, in almost every case, the court will allow the departing employee 
to work for a competitor although the court will often provide parameters 
for how the employee can work in a manner that adequately protects its 
former employer’s trade secrets. In other words, to borrow a fact pattern 
from a recent case,199 an injunction that orders a software programmer to 
avoid working on smart phone operating systems for a period of time is a 
UTSA allowed, judicially tailored remedy to channel a departing 
employee’s scope of work in a safe direction, rather than enforcement of a 
contract that restrains an employee from engaging in a profession that 
runs afoul of Section 16600. 
Even if enforcement of the UTSA is called a “trade secret exception” 
to Section 16600, California should embrace it. California trial courts 
need to deploy all remedies allowed by the UTSA, including remedies 
that limit work to the extent necessary to protect trade secrets, so that 
the statute can fully do its important work to foster innovation. With 
this approach, California can create a legal infrastructure comparable 
to Washington’s leaky non-compete infrastructure but coming at it 
from a different direction. 
Trial courts, of course, should avoid granting injunctive relief that 
looks like the overly broad language found in many non-competes.200 
Instead, trial courts should grant injunctions that look like the 
settlement agreements that employers and departing employees enter 
into which right-size the employee’s new job description to avoid 
trade secret misappropriation issues.201 That approach encourages safe 
and fair competition, which are two of the primary goals of trade 
secret law.202 Part IV.B proposes guiding principles for trial courts to 
 
 199 See Amazon.com, Inc. v. Powers, No. C12-1911RAJ, 2012 WL 6726538, at *3-4 
(W.D. Wash. Dec. 27, 2012). 
 200 Some scholars believe that recent cases indicate that trial courts are already 
giving heightened scrutiny to non-competes. Garrison & Wendt, supra note 17, at 135. 
 201 See LEVY, supra note 144, at 283 (reporting that trial judge Steven Gonzalez 
prohibited Kai-Fu Lee from sharing proprietary information or helping Google with 
competitive technologies such as search and speech recognition but allowing him to 
participate in the establishment of Google’s operation in China which was the primary 
reason that Google had recruited Mr. Lee); see also EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. 
Supp. 2d 299, 304-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing how knowledge may become 
quickly obsolete in the digital world). 
 202 Trade secret law has roots in tort law, which remedies injurious appropriation 
of someone’s valuable secret information. Early trade secret cases in the United States 
drew on principles set out in the first Restatement of Torts. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) 
OF TORTS § 757 (1939). In addition to its tort underpinnings, trade secret law has 
roots in the law of unfair competition. See Balboa Ins. Co. v. Trans Global Equities, 
267 Cal. Rptr. 787, 795 (Ct. App. 1990) (“[A]t bottom, trade secret protection is itself 
but a branch of unfair competition law.”). As a result, the third Restatement of Unfair 
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follow that encourage this targeted, context driven approach to 
injunctive relief in departing employee cases.203 
B. Guiding Principles for Granting Pre-Trial Injunctive Relief 
The trial court’s approach to granting remedies in non-compete 
cases plays a critical role in patrolling the boundary between 
protecting legitimate knowledge spillovers and preventing trade secret 
misappropriation.204 Given the importance of pre-trial injunctive relief 
in non-compete cases,205 I propose a set of four guiding principles for 
assessing whether a trial court should grant a temporary restraining 
order or preliminary injunction. These guiding principles focus the 
trial court’s attention on trade secret protection where the argument 
for enforcement of non-competes is strongest. The guiding principles 
can be illustrated by this chart: 
 
Likelihood of Injunctive Relief 
LESS MORE
Trade secret value low Trade secret value high
Employment not directly 
competitive 
Employment directly competitive 
Misappropriation threat remote Misappropriation threat imminent 
Misappropriation injury unclear Misappropriation injury clear 
These guiding principles suggest that a trial court should only grant 
pre-trial injunctive relief in cases where the employer’s trade secrets 
are valuable and the departing employee will be working for a 
 
Competition contains a detailed articulation of trade secret law. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995). 
 203 See Garrison & Wendt, supra note 17, at 110 (“The court read the 
noncompetition and nonsolicitation paragraph of Lee’s Microsoft Employment 
Agreement narrowly.”); supra Part IV.B. 
 204 Commentators have noted the importance of remedies for maintaining balance 
in intellectual property law. See Orit Fischman Afori, Flexible Remedies as a Means to 
Counteract Failures in Copyright Law, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 18-24 (2011); 
Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Fostering the Business of Innovation: The Untold Story of 
Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 445, 457-64 (2012); Peter 
Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REV. 39, 102-03 (2008); 
see also Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Enforcement of Open Source Licenses: The MDY Trio’s 
Inconvenient Complications, 14 YALE J.L. & TECH. 106, 124-25 (2011) (arguing for a 
remedies-based approach). 
 205 See Bishara, Martin & Thomas, supra note 29, at 46. 
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competitor doing work that is actually competitive with the work that 
the employee did for the former employer. Moreover, the trial court 
must be convinced that the threat of trade secret misappropriation is 
imminent and the injury to the former employer is clear.206 
C. Two Ways to Reduce In Terrorem Effects of Non-Competes 
As discussed above, one of the gravest concerns about non-competes 
is their potential in terrorem effect. Part III explained why the chilling 
effect of non-competes is less than feared when non-compete 
enforcement is leaky. However, more can and should be done to 
reduce any fears that creative workers have of unfair enforcement of 
non-competes by their former employers. 
1. Non-Compete Litigation Insurance 
Every automobile driver fears the consequences of getting in an 
automobile accident. Drivers reduce that fear by purchasing insurance. 
Auto insurance eliminates two important concerns: (1) litigation costs 
and (2) damages. Non-compete litigation insurance could eliminate 
the same two fear factors for creative workers in the technology 
industry.207 Indeed, purchasing insurance which guarantees pre-paid, 
well qualified legal counsel in a non-compete lawsuit would be 
particularly useful because finding and paying for lawyers is the often 
the biggest concern of a departing employee who is sued by his or her 
former employer. The insurance could also compensate the worker for 
wages lost if the former employer successfully enforces the non-
compete. Many creative workers in the technology industry would be 
sophisticated enough to pursue non-compete litigation insurance but 
for those who cannot or do not pursue insurance, the next section 
suggests another way to reduce in terrorem risks of non-competes. 
 
 206 See Lincicum, supra note 198, at 1277. 
 207 In response to potential threats of patent litigation for use of open source Linux 
software, insurance companies offered insurance to reduce users’ fear of litigation. See 
Steven Vaughan-Nichols, Open-Source Insurance Provider Finds Patent Risks in Linux, 
EWEEK (Aug. 2, 2004), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Linux-and-Open-Source/OpenSource-
Insurance-Provider-Finds-Patent-Risks-in-Linux; see also Jennifer E. Rothman, Best 
Intentions: Reconsidering Best Practices Statements in the Context of Fair Use and Copyright 
Law, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 371, 374-75 (2010) (describing insurance for claims 
of copyright fair use). 
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2. Attorneys’ Fees Legislation 
As just mentioned, one of the most serious threats that a departing 
creative worker faces (and fears acutely) is the cost of non-compete 
litigation. Even if the employee ultimately prevails or the case settles, 
he or she may be saddled with a large bill for attorneys’ fees. State 
legislation could address this concern. A state could pass legislation 
that allows a trial court to award attorneys’ fees to a prevailing 
employee in a non-compete lawsuit. 
Several states allow the prevailing party to recover attorneys’ fees via 
their unfair competition208 or general civil law209 statutes, which may 
apply to non-compete litigation. A few states specifically address non-
competes. Florida, for example, permits the prevailing party in a non-
compete case (employer or employee) to recover its attorneys’ fees,210 
and state statutes that target non-competes in the broadcast industry 
allow the employee to recover attorneys’ fees.211 Texas law takes a 
particularly nuanced approach. The Texas statute addressing non-
competes contains the following provision: 
If . . . the [employee] promisor establishes that the promisee 
knew at the time of the execution of the agreement that the 
covenant did not contain limitations as to time, geographical 
area, and scope of activity to be restrained that were 
 
 208 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 553.12 (2015) (allowing for recovery of “the 
necessary costs of bringing suit, including a reasonable attorney fee” for prohibited 
restraint on trade or commerce); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.57 (2015) (permitting 
treble damages, costs, disbursements, and reasonable attorneys’ fees for unlawful 
restraint of trade); MO. STAT. § 416.031, .121 (2015) (awarding treble damages, 
reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs of suit for unlawful restraint of trade).  
 209 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-341.01 (2015) (authorizing the court to 
award reasonable attorney fees for “contested action arising out of a contract, express 
or implied”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-22-308 (2015) (permitting collection of attorney’s 
fee as costs in civil actions unless otherwise prohibited by law or contract); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 12-120 (2015) (requiring plaintiff to make written demand on defendant 
for attorney’s fees in some instances). 
 210 FLA. STAT. § 542.335(k) (2015). 
 211 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-50b(c) (2015) (allowing broadcast employees 
to recover damages”, together with court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees” for 
violations of the section); D.C. CODE § 32-533 (2015) (“Any broadcasting industry 
employer who violates § 32-532 shall be liable for damages, attorney’s fees, and 
costs.”); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 17/10 § 15 (2015) (providing that violations of 
prohibition on “post-employment covenants not to compete” are remedied through 
award of civil damages, attorney’s fees, and costs); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 149, § 
186 (2015) (permitting recovery of “reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs associated 
with litigation” of a void and unenforceable post-employment area and time 
restriction). 
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reasonable and the limitations imposed a greater restraint than 
necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of 
the promisee, and the promisee sought to enforce the covenant 
to a greater extent than was necessary to protect the goodwill 
or other business interest of the promisee, the court may 
award . . . reasonable attorney’s fees.212 
On the surface, giving both the employer and the employee the ability 
to recover attorneys’ fees seems even handed. However, if an employer 
can recover attorneys’ fees, then this may actually increase the chilling 
effect of non-competes. Not only will the departing employee fear 
paying a large bill to his or her lawyers, the employee will further fear 
paying a large bill of the employer’s lawyers.213 Thus, an attorneys’ fees 
statute in the non-compete arena should rebalance the unequal 
bargaining position214 between employer and employee and reduce 
chilling effects by allowing only prevailing employees to recover 
attorneys’ fees.215 Texas’ statute provides one model for this approach. It 
allows an employee to recover attorneys’ fees if an employer overreaches 
as it attempts to enforce a non-compete. However, the Texas law only 
applies if the employer knew at the time of the agreement that the non-
compete was overly broad. Simply allowing a prevailing employee to 
recover attorneys’ fee would be cleaner and better at reducing chilling 
effects. Indeed, this is the approach taken by Hawaii216 and in several 
 
 212 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51 (2015). 
 213 Cf. Robert A. Brown & James P. Clements, A Patent-Troll Bill with Bad College 
Grades, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 14, 2015, 6:48 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-patent-troll-
bill-with-bad-college-grades-1429051694 (objecting to a “loser pays” attorneys’ fee 
provision in proposed patent troll legislation as creating the wrong litigation incentives).  
 214 Note, however, that for small firms the inequality in bargaining power is less 
clear and, moreover, since small firms lean heavily on trade secret protection, they 
often have a particularly compelling need to enforce a non-compete. 
 215 States that decide to reduce chilling effects by allowing only employees to 
recover attorneys’ fees in non-compete cases may also need to consider potentially 
conflicting attorneys’ fees provisions in general civil law and unfair competition 
statues that allow the “prevailing party” to recover fees. For example, several states 
provide that if a contract allows one party to recover attorneys’ fees, then the other 
party is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees as well. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1717 (2015); 
FLA. STAT. § 57.105(7) (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-704 (2015); ORE. REV. STAT. 
§ 20.096(1) (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-826 (2015); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 4.84.330 (2015). A state could, by statute, void any contractual provision in a non-
compete that allows the employer to recover fees if it prevails or limit the recovery of 
fees to situations where the employer’s trade secrets or good will are threatened. Cf. 
FLA. STAT. 542.335(k) (2015) (“A court shall not enforce any contractual provision 
limiting the court’s authority under this section.”). 
 216 HAW. REV. STAT. § 607-9 (2015). 
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state statutes aimed at protecting employees in the broadcast industry 
from unfair non-competes.217 
Moreover, the statute could define an employee “prevailing” in 
litigation to include a case in which the trial court blue pencils or only 
partially enforces a non-compete because of its over breadth. By doing 
this, the legislation encourages employers to draft more reasonable 
non-competes on the front end218 rather than drafting broad non-
competes and hoping for the best in enforcement litigation (an 
approach that scholars fear enhances the in terrorem effect of non-
competes).219 The legislation could require an employer to inform an 
employee of the attorneys’ fees legislation at the same time that the 
employee is asked to agree to the non-compete as well as in any 
demand letter that the employer sends to the departing employee 
threatening non-compete litigation. This type of notice would 
maximize the fear-reducing nature of the legislation 
D. The Washington Way Is Not Just Washington’s Way 
Part III described Washington State’s leaky non-compete legal 
infrastructure. I called this “the Washington way.” However, I doubt 
that the Washington way is only Washington’s way. I would not be 
surprised if future research revealed leaky non-compete enforcement in 
the technology sector of many other states that take a rule of reason 
approach to enforcing non-competes.220 In those states where 
enforcement of non-competes may not be leaky at present, courts 
should duly note the advantages for innovation of relatively capacious 
knowledge spillovers and encourage leakiness by enforcing non-
competes with pre-trial injunctive relief only when valuable trade 
secrets are genuinely at risk of misappropriation.221 Lawyers counseling 
 
 217 See supra note 211.  
 218 See Blake, supra note 3, at 687-89 (discussing the importance of drafting 
appropriately scoped non-competes). 
 219 A court may refuse to enforce an overbroad non-compete if it finds that the 
employer did not act in good faith. See, e.g., Cent. Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 
678 S.W.2d 28, 37 (Tenn. 1984) (rule of reason allows enforcement of non-competes 
that “are reasonably necessary to protect employer’s interest” “unless the circumstances 
indicate bad faith on the part of the employer”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 184 (1981) (reformation permitted “if the party who seeks to enforce the term 
obtained it in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing”). 
 220 Scholars already report that courts in certain states such as Texas seem 
particularly hostile to the enforcement of non-competes. See Wood, supra note 16, at 36. 
 221 Non-compete enforcement may not be leaky in all states. See Simon & Loten, 
supra note 25 (reporting on research conducted for the WSJ by the law firm of Beck 
Reed Riden showing that since 2002 non-compete cases rose 61% across the U.S. to 
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employers in the technology industry can encourage leakiness too by 
reminding the employer (especially an emotional client caught up in the 
heat of the moment) of the long list of pragmatic reasons for holding 
back from bringing a non-compete lawsuit.222 
CONCLUSION 
Do states need to ban non-competes as California has done in order 
to provide the optimal legal infrastructure for innovation? This Article 
provides an answer to that important and intriguing question by 
examining, for the first time, whether technology firms actually 
enforce non-competes. Evidence from Washington State indicates that 
technology firms rarely enforce non-competes. In other words, non-
competes are very leaky — creative workers move freely from one 
technology business to another in Washington just as they do in 
California. The Washington case study has crucial implications for all 
states. It suggests that states do not need to adopt California’s 
approach in order to foster innovation. It also shows that leaky non-
competes provide better protection for trade secrets than a complete 
ban provides. States can offer a fertile legal infrastructure for 
innovation without banning non-competes by taking steps to assure 
that non-compete enforcement is leaky, including measures to address 
the potential chilling effect of non-competes. California, for its part, 
should embrace the so-called “trade secret exception” to its ban on 
non-competes to improve California’s legal infrastructure for start-ups 
and established firms that rely on robust trade secret protection. 
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